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ABSTRACT
MEGAN GOODWIN – Mythical Beasts: 
How Queer Bodies Expand the Religious Imaginary
(Under the direction of Randall Styers)
The chiasmus of  work on and with the body (askesis) and knowledge created by being-
in-body (noesis) makes possible radically different thought about bodies and religiosity. 
Religion thus emerges as a site of meaning-making: an explanation for why one's body is 
the way that it is and a space in which to celebrate that body and use it in service to the 
divine.  I read Foucault's theory of becoming-homosexual and Jantzen's religious 
philosophy of becoming-divine against the interviews and writings of Raven Kaldera, a 
male-to-female transsexual in the Northern Tradition.  Kaldera's story is one of self-
fashioning: he has shaped his body and his life to reflect his noetic experience of the 
divine – Hela, Norse patroness of the dead, requested that Kaldera serve as shaman to a 
sexually transgressive Norse Pagan community.  I conclude that Kaldera instantiates a 
liberatory model of religiosity for those excluded by the western religious imaginary.
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"I've gotten up every morning for the past 18 years and looked in the mirror and seen an 
abstraction made flesh, a mythical beast. It is very, very real for me. Here I am, folks, a 
unicorn, a dragon, a chimera. Here I am, fellow beasties. Are there enough of us, yet, to 
spill over the pages of the fairy tale books and hold hostage the rules of this world?" 
        ~ Raven Kaldera, astroqueer.tripod.com
“The god of the imagination is the imagination. The law of the imagination is, whatever 
works. The law of the imagination is not universal truth, but the work's truth, fought for 
and won.”
                         ~ Salman Rushdie, The Ground Beneath Her Feet
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INTRODUCTION
 Mythical Beasts
Every May since 1979, EarthSpirit has hosted the Rites of Spring in the Berkshire 
Hills of western Massachusetts.  Rites of Spring is among the largest and oldest Pagan 
festivals in the United States.  The festival offers workshops, rituals, and performances to 
celebrate the earth as sacred.  In May 1990, a Pagan woman attended a workshop on 
sacred androgyny with two men, her husband and her lover.  She remembers:
I walked into [the] workshop...and a large, heavyset, hairy woman with a 
body like mine (and a 5 o'clock shadow like mine—only mine was blond 
and didn't show) got up and told everyone about how she was an 
intersexual who'd found a spiritual calling in hir1 condition. I sat stunned, 
my tongue frozen in my mouth.
 
I'd always believed it was something to hide, a shameful, annoying thing. 
My husband and lover, who flanked me, didn't even know what I was. I'd 
1 Pronouns become slippery when you're disrupting the gender binary.  Throughout this thesis, I default 
to “xe” (subjective) and “hir” (objective) whenever gender identity is indeterminate.  Gender-
ambiguous pronouns are jarring and disruptive.  Here, that disruption is absolutely intentional, in 
deference to and indicative of the negotiation and transgression of  gender boundaries that characterize 
transgender identity.
Despite his painstakingly and religiously cultivated third gender identity, however, Kaldera 
linguistically identifies as male – which is to say that he uses male pronouns to describe and refer to 
himself.  He addresses his deliberate use of male pronouns in his essay, “Feminist on Testosterone:”
There is no appropriate pronoun in English for a masculine androgyne, or a feminine 
androgyne. The neuter pronoun in our language is reserved for inanimate objects. 
Therefore, by process of elimination, the only available and appropriate pronoun for a 
masculine androgyne (FTM) is "he", and for a feminine androgyne (MTF) is "she". To do 
otherwise is a blatant fuck-you, saying that you don't care whether or not you ever have 
any kind of meaningful communication with that person. Deliberately using a pronoun 
that you know will offend someone is no different than using a racist or sexist term to 
describe them. Either way, you are telling the world that they have no say in your public 
definition of them and the marginalized group that they belong to (ravenkaldera.org).
Thus when discussing Kaldera, I employ specifically male pronouns.
hidden it that well. And here there was someone like me, someone saying 
that this was a gift from the gods? I walked out shaking all over. 
(library.humboldt.edu)
Today, this shaken woman is Raven Kaldera, a female-to-male transgendered shaman2 in 
the Northern Pagan tradition.  Kaldera was born with an intersex condition called 
secondary congenital adrenal hyperplasia3 and was raised as female 
(churchofasphodel.org).  Though he lived as a woman for decades, Kaldera recalls that he 
never “felt like” a woman: “I was often accused of 'male behavior,' even when I couldn't 
figure out what was wrong with my behavior” (library.humboldt.edu).  He married a man 
and gave birth to a daughter (library.humboldt.edu).  Kaldera credits Siren, the intersex 
woman leading the sacred androgyny workshop mentioned above, with first inspiring him 
to come out as a “sacred third gender” individual (twpt.com).
Despite the impact the workshop had on him, he did not have gender reassignment 
surgery immediately.  Kaldera's body later began to reject the artificial female hormones 
he'd taken since puberty.  The hemorrhaging caused by this rejection was life-threatening. 
In what Kaldera recounts as a near-death experience, he was visited by Hela, Norse 
goddess of death.  Kaldera recalls that he had ignored his body dysphoria and the 
2 I have no interest in entering debates about the legitimacy of non-indigenous magic-practitioners using 
the term “shaman.”  Neither am I concerned with exploring either the construction of historical 
shamanic practice or that of neo-shamanism.  My primary focus is the dual construction of gender and 
religious performance.  I use the term “shaman” here because Raven uses it.  
Briefly, Raven defines shaman as “a spiritual and magical practice that involves working with spirits 
and is designed to serve a tribe” (northernshamanism.org).  He traces the words to Siberian roots, 
specifically the Tungus people.  “Unfortunately,” he writes, “the English language does not have a 
single word for 'spirit-worker who has been seized by the spirits, died and been reborn to a lifetime 
dedicated to serving a tribe via their spirit-given abilities.' The reasons for that are the fault of our 
ancestors, but the damage is done. We need a word. This one is already in use... Although the word 
'shaman' is currently surrounded by a swirl of confusion and controversy, it's a place to start; a beacon to 
lead those who need it to what they need” (northernshamanism.org).
  
3 Congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) is a group of inherited disorders of the adrenal gland.  The body 
produces more androgen, causing traditionally male characteristics to appear early or, as in Raven's 
case, unexpectedly.  CAH affects both male and female fetuses; the increased androgen levels produce 
sex/gender “ambiguity” in chromosomally female fetuses only.  For more on intersexuality, see Morgan 
Holmes's 2008 Intersex: A Perilous Difference.  
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hormonally-induced hemorrhaging until  “the Goddess who owns my ass ordered me to 
do this, to get on with it already.  When I protested, she told me that she was sending me 
where I was needed most” (sensuoussadie.com).  
Kaldera attributes his decision to surgically and hormonally alter his body to 
Hela's command.  He had a bilateral mastectomy and began taking testosterone.  In the 
late 1990s, Kaldera founded Northern Tradition Shamanism, a Pagan tradition that 
creatively reconstructs and re-imagines Viking religiosity by combining medieval 
Scandinavian civil codes and mythology with personal experiences of the Norse gods. 
The tradition's membership is almost wholly queer.  Kaldera explains that Hela ordered 
him to change his sex so as to better serve his tribe: transpeople, genderqueers, and other 
sexual transgressors who honor the Norse pantheon (lgbtran.com; “Transgendered Spirit 
Workers,” ravenkaldera.org).  
At its base, Kaldera's narrative is one of learning to think in radically different 
ways about bodies and religion – and of creating alternative modes of relationship with 
self, community, and the divine based on that radically different thinking.  To call 
Kaldera's gender performance4 transgressive is perhaps an understatement: as Kaldera 
himself has noted, his silent bodily presence in a room deliberately challenges commonly 
held assumptions about gender as binary and sex as  biologically determined (Kaldera 
4 My use of the word “performance” here is of course informed by Judith Butler's theories of gender 
performativity, particularly as presented in her 1992 Bodies That Matter.  Briefly, performance in this 
context implies neither disingenuousness nor radical voluntarism in the behaviors that characterize 
gender identity.  Rather, gender performance is informed and constrained by cultural constructions of 
sex/gender.  For Butler, then, gender is both something we are and something we do.  As she explains in 
Undoing Gender: “If gender is a kind of doing, an incessant activity performed, in part, without one's 
knowing and without one's willing, it is not for that reason automatic or mechanical.  On the contrary, it 
is a practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint” (Butler 2006, 1). 
Kaldera explicitly refers to the performative qualities of his own gender identity in his essay, “Ergi: The 
Way of the Third.”  I discuss the concept of ergi, or unmanliness, in my second section; for now, we 
need only note that Kaldera understands his “unmanliness” or third-sex identity as performative because 
unmanliness is, for shamans, “both something we are and something we do” (“Ergi,” ravenkaldera.org). 
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2002, 23).5  Likewise, his religious beliefs and practices run counter to those of what 
philosopher Grace Jantzen called the western religious imaginary: whereas western 
divinity has traditionally been understood as male, singular, transcendent, fixed, and 
presumably heterosexual and white for all that “He” is disembodied, Kaldera's gods are 
multiple, mutable, immanent, carnal, and decidedly queer.  
This project is about the intersection of queer bodies with queer religiosity – about 
what happens when people whose bodies do not fit neatly on either side of a gender 
binary go looking for (or, as in Raven's case, are found by) deity/ies who reflect(s) the 
experience of being in bodies that don't fit the “normal” order of sex/gender.  For the 
purposes of this project, I define queerness broadly.  In referring to sex, gender, and 
carnality, I intend the term to encompass both sex/gender and sexual practices.  Bodily 
queerness, then, should not be understood as the binary opposite to heterosexuality, but 
incorporates same-sex sexual object choice, non-traditional gender presentation 
(transsexuality, transgenderism, intersexuality), and transgressive sexual practices 
(including but not limited to celibacy, s/m, and non-monogamy/polyamory).  In short, 
bodily queerness refers to both sexuate bodies and sexual practices.  Queer religiosity 
expands the western religious imaginary – it reflects and celebrates the multiplicity and 
mutability of this bodily queerness in honoring and/or worshiping multiple,6 mutable, 
immanent god/dess/es who sanctify non-traditional sexes, genders, and sexualities.
The construction of religious beliefs and practices that hallow bodily queernesses 
5 Here again, my thinking on sex/gender is informed by Butler – see both Bodies That Matter and 
Undoing Gender.  Butler disputes the binarization of sex and gender, such that sex designates biology 
and gender indicates cultural construction.  Rather, as she argues in Bodies That Matter, scientific 
discourse is itself shaped and constrained by cultural understandings and expectations regarding 
anatomy.  See also Megan Goodwin, “Be Witched, OR, the Function of Citation in Abject Religious 
Discourse” (paper presented at the Southeastern Commission for the Study of Religion meeting, 
Atlanta, GA, 7-9 March 2008).
6 'Multiple” here includes but is not limited to polytheistic religiosity.  Cf. Laurel Schneider's work on 
theologies of multiplicity in Beyond Monotheism.  
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and allow them to flourish is, I suggest, a move toward expanding both the western 
religious imaginary and a western bodily imaginary.  In using the term imaginary, I do not 
mean to diminish or demean the beliefs, practices, or bodily experiences in question. 
This is to say that “imaginary” should not be read as “untrue.” Rather, I use the term to 
designate the symbolic and linguistic systems that inform and constrain our 
understandings of what it is possible to do, be, think, and believe.  As Grace Jantzen 
defined it in her 1999 Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion, the 
western religious imaginary traditionally understands divinity as transcendent, logical, 
infinite, salvation-oriented, and disembodied (while paradoxically also portraying god as 
one heterosexual white man).  The western bodily imaginary, I suggest, insists that bodies 
can be neatly divided into two biologically evident sexes, and that the sex evident at a 
child's birth is a permanent feature of that child's identity.  
Kaldera and his tribe of sexual transgressors are simultaneously and deliberately 
challenging both religious and bodily imaginaries.  Regarding the gender binary, Kaldera 
states: 
We are advocating an entire renovation of the gender system. We may 
disagree on what it should look like, but we're pretty much in favor of 
bringing on the drills and chisels. We shouldn't pretend otherwise; it 
insults the intelligence of the frightened masses. Yes, what you fear is true. 
And you know what? You'll live.  (library.humboldt.edu)
In other words, Kaldera advocates a radical deconstruction and re-imagining—a queering
—of gender.  And with good reason: the western bodily imaginary does not admit that 
Kaldera and people like him exist.  For this reason, Kaldera refers to himself as a 
“mythical beast:”
I'm not just a medical condition. I'm a mythical beast. I know because 
when I was I0 years old, I found the word for what I am in a book of 
Greek myths and it said so. Two years later, when I hit puberty and grew 
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breasts and facial hair, saw my hips spread and heard my voice crack, bled 
and got erect, I knew it was true. They said it was a myth, but here I am—
a unicorn, a dragon, a monster, a piece of magic let loose on the world. 
Your reality gives ground before my undeniably solid presence. 
(library.humboldt.edu)
Thus for Kaldera and his tribe, expanding the western bodily imaginary is not a 
philosophical exercise but rather a demand for recognition: this, too, is what bodies can 
be.  His religious practice, Northern Tradition Shamanism, reflects and instantiates 
Kaldera's experience of being-in-body, as well as his relationship with Hela and the rest 
of the Norse pantheon.  I refer to the knowledge created by this bodily and religious 
experience as bodily noesis, a concept to which I shall theorize more fully later in the 
paper.  I mean first to establish the relationship between gender and religion, as Kaldera 
understands both terms.
In an interview with The Wiccan/Pagan Times, Kaldera explained that his 
tradition, Northern Tradition Shamanism, closely resembles other Pagan 
reconstructionisms in its emphasis on deism, polytheism, animism, and spiritual 
discipline (twpt.com).  “Translated without all the big words,” Kaldera says, “that means 
that I firmly, solidly, and even fanatically believe the following: The Gods are real, not 
merely archetypes, and are independent of our existence. All gods are not one god or 
goddess, but have separate existences. All natural things (and some manmade things) 
have an indwelling spirit. Spiritual discipline to burn off karma is always worthy work” 
(twpt.com).  Polytheism and animism, among other qualities, directly challenge the 
western religious imaginary.  
Further, Kaldera insists that gender—specifically transgender—can and should 
play a central role in one's religiosity (lgbtran.org).  As I noted previously, most of his 
tribe are queer.  Of the roughly 30 members of Northern Tradition Shamanism, 
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approximately 80% are transgendered.  According to one such member,7 if we expand the 
definition of queerness to include “atypical gender presentation…third gender, 
androgyne, or any degree of gender dysphoria, or simple gender transgression… that 
percentage rises to 99%.”   Northern Tradition Shamanism creates space for and 
sanctifies non-traditional gender identities while challenging the western religious 
imaginary.  
Analysis of the religious work Kaldera is doing requires a definition of religion 
that extends well beyond belief.  For the purposes of this paper, religion refers not merely 
to thea/ology, nor to practice understood strictly as ritual.  Kaldera owns and operates a 
Pagan homestead in western Massachusetts: his life is tied to the land, and organized by 
his religiously informed ethics – which encompass everything from the remunerations he 
is allowed to accept for his shamanic services to the ways and times in which he can 
slaughter his animals for food or sacrifices.  Religion in this context is a lived and living 
thing: it concerns daily realities, activities, and objects; but it is also literally, 
emphatically embodied – by which I mean grounded in the experience of and knowledge 
created by being in a mortal, changeable body.8  
William James used the term noesis to designate the authorization of personal 
experience as knowledge of the divine (Proudfoot 1985, 136). I shall use the term here in 
specific corporal terms: bodily noesis refers to the creation of knowledge about the divine 
by bodily-being (or sexuateness, in Jantzen's terms).  Practice and thea/ology can and do 
shift to reflect bodily contingency; however, lived religion also reflects work on and with 
that mutable body.  I shall call this work on and with the body askesis – in Foucauldean 
7 Galina Krasskova, email message to author, 29 Oct 2008.
8 Jantzen highlights the contingent and finite nature of humanity in relationship with divinity in her 
Becoming Divine, a point to which I shall return in my third section.
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terms, technologies of the self.  
In this paper, I argue that religion occurs at an an intersection point—a chiasmus9
—between bodily noesis and queer askesis.  That is, religious belief and practice may 
occur at the point at which knowledge created by being-in-body and deliberate work with 
and on that body toward ethical subjectivity come together.  This chiasmus makes it 
possible to think differently about both bodies and religion.  Thus religion emerges as a 
site of meaning-making: an explanation for why one's body is the way that it is and a 
space in which to celebrate that body and use it in service to the divine.  In Kaldera's 
case, he suggests that he was born intersex and transgender to better serve a sexually 
transgressive community.  In researching subarctic circumpolar shamanisms, Kaldera 
said that he 
discovered that there were accounts of exactly what I had gone through 
[near-death experiences, visitations from spirits and/or deities], from all 
around the world… [and] many shamans were also gender crossing. You 
don’t have to be [transgendered], but it is the one job for which it was an 
advantage. So it’s very clear to me why this was done to me. The powers 
that be [did this] in order that I would have this advantage and do my job 
better. (shewired.com)
This quote exemplifies the noetic quality of bodily being; but it must be noted that bodies 
are not fixed in time and shape.  Bodies change over time: they grow and shrink, age and 
strengthen.  Our bodies can also mean very different things to us and to others over the 
course of our lives.  We can moreover work to alter our bodily behaviors to change and 
improve ourselves, just as Kaldera worked and continues to work on and with his body to 
serve Hela and his community.  Thus Kaldera instantiates not only a religious bodily 
9 I borrow this term from Jantzen via Derrida and Levinas.  As she explained it: “a chiasmus is a figure 
taken from the Greek letter X (“chi”), which shows a crossing-over, an interconnection and yet separate 
trajectories...[a chiasmus] symbolizes both that we cannot start from nowhere—we are always already 
situated in relation to a dominant text/discourse and culture and must take it seriously—and also that we 
need to look for ways in which that dominant reading is intersected by its own undoing, thus opening up 
a gap for thinking differently” (Jantzen 1999, 74-5).
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noesis, but also a cultivation of the bodily self as an ethical subject, or askesis.
I've conceptualized this work on the self as askesis for several reasons – primarily 
because Foucault's project of homosexuality as an ethical horizon heavily informed my 
thinking on Kaldera's bodily/religious identity.  I discuss Foucault's “becoming gay” at 
length in the following section; however, let me briefly say that queer askesis works as a 
model for this kind of thinking about embodied religiosity for two reasons.  First, askesis  
is a liberatory project, dedicated to illustrating the extent to which radically different 
though about sexuate bodies is possible and ethical; and second, because Foucault 
understood homosexual becoming as an imaginary project, much in the same terms as I 
have described my own project of bodily and religious imaginaries.  Paramount among 
these reasons, however, is that Raven Kaldera's story is one of self-fashioning: he has 
shaped his body and his life to reflect his noetic experience of the divine – specifically, 
Hela's request that Raven serve as shaman to a sexually transgressive Norse Pagan 
community.  
In arguing for a religious chiasmus between queer askesis and bodily noesis, I 
have divided this paper into three sections. My primary methodology throughout this 
paper will be discourse analysis and textual ethnography, by which I mean engaging my 
interlocutor through his interviews and essays.  I begin by outlining Foucault's project of 
homosexual becoming as he presented it in his interviews with the gay press from 1981 
until 1982.  I suggest that the second two volumes of his History of Sexuality theorized 
askesis in large part to support this gay becoming.  I then demonstrate the occlusions of 
Foucault's project, specifically those of gender, queer bodies, and religiosity.  I suggest 
that while Foucault's queer asketical project offers insight into Kaldera's self-fashioning, 
the masculinism and secularism of homosexual becoming render the project ultimately 
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insufficient to encompass Kaldera's queer religiosity.  
In my second section, I demonstrate the ways in which Kaldera both instantiates 
and challenges Foucault's model, particularly with regard to Foucault's insistence upon 
secularism and queer practice to the exclusion of religion and queer bodies.  I suggest that 
the knowledge created by Kaldera's experience of being-in-body (noesis) informs the 
transgressive self-cultivation (askesis) of his gender and religious identity.  Third, I 
examine the ways in which bodily noesis and queer askesis work toward expanding 
religious and bodily imaginaries.  To this end, I place Jantzen's model of becoming divine 
and Foucault's becoming homosexual in conversation with Kaldera's work on and with 
his body.  I conclude by suggesting that Kaldera instantiates the potential for religion to 
mark a chiasmus between bodily noesis and queer askesis, thus providing a liberatory 
model of religiosity for those excluded by the western religious imaginary.  
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CHAPTER ONE
BECOMING HOMOSEXUAL: FOUCAULT'S QUEER ASKESIS
I suggested in my introduction that religion can act as a nexus for embodied 
knowledge of self (noesis) and work on that self toward ethical subjectivity (askesis). 
Work on and with the body that also insists on acknowledging the multiplicity and 
mutability of bodily-being makes possible radically different—queer—understandings of 
corporal religiosity.  These queer understandings of both bodies and religion present 
liberative possibilities in their affirmation of both queer bodies and queer experiences of 
the divine – that is, those understandings of divinity that fall beyond or outside the scope 
of the western religious imaginary.  
This section focuses on work on and with the body toward ethical becoming, 
specifically in the context of Foucauldean askesis.  I read askeses, or technologies of the 
self as presented in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, as part of Foucault's 
project of becoming homosexual.  That Foucault understood homosexuality as a horizon, 
as something to be desired and worked toward, is significant for my project because it 
suggests that queerness can (also) be deliberate ethical work on and with the body. 
However, as I shall demonstrate, Foucault's model of homosexual becoming was both 
masculinist and secularist, thus complicating the radical voluntarism of his project and 
excluding queer bodies and religiosity from “becoming gay.”
In this section, I explore the concept of queer askesis: that is, Foucault's liberatory 
project of sexually transgressive work on and with the body toward ethical subjectivity.  I 
argue that Foucault's project of homosexual becoming provides an insightful analytical 
model for thinking about the transformative potentiality of sexual transgression; however, 
his project also occludes the creatively disruptive potential of queer bodies and/or 
religion from becoming homosexual.  
Foucault introduced the concept of “becoming gay” in his interviews with the 
French and American gay press from 1981 to 1982, and argued for its historical precedent 
in the context of male-male sexual behaviors in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the 
Self.  I begin by examining Foucault's  interviews with the gay press.  I then place the 
interviews in conversation with the second two volumes of his History of Sexuality to 
demonstrate the ways in which Foucault's historical project supported male same-sex 
sexual behaviors (and sexual transgression more broadly) as work toward ethical 
subjectivity.  Finally, I discuss the occlusions of Foucault's project – specifically the 
masculinism and secularism inherent in homosexual becoming.  I conclude by briefly 
reviewing the subject-forming role religion has played throughout Foucault's work, thus 
providing a genealogy for the Foucauldean relationship between religion and bodies. 
This sets the stage for discussing the ways in which Raven Kaldera's religious work on 
and with his body both confirms and challenges Foucault's broader liberative project: that 
of thinking differently about sexuate bodies, and expanding the possibilities for what 
those bodies can do and mean.  
Becoming Gay: Interviews, April 1981 – June 1982
In interviews he gave to the French and American gay press from 1981-1982, 
Foucault suggested that homosexuality was not an identity, but rather something to be 
desired.  “We have to work at becoming homosexuals and not be obstinate in recognizing 
that we are” (Foucault 1996a, 308).  To become gay, he suggested, was to continuously 
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work on oneself, both to prioritize sexual choices and to allow those choices to change 
one's entire life (Foucault 1996c, 370).  Homosexuality represented the potential for new 
pleasures, new relationships, new ways of being in the world.  For Foucault, then, 
becoming gay entailed a virtualité, the possibility of becoming more than what we are, 
and the space to seek pleasures that don't necessarily conform to a static sexual identity.  
Foucault located “becoming gay” within the ethical project of the second and third 
volumes of his History of Sexuality.  In “Friendship as a Way of Life,” he referred to a 
“homosexual askesis,” one that would “make work on ourselves and invent, I do not say 
discover, a manner of being that is still improbable” (Foucault 1996a, 310).  Askesis, as 
Foucault introduces it in The Use of Pleasure, is a technology by which one cultivates 
oneself in pursuit of ethical subjectivity: work one does on oneself for the good of the self 
and that self's society.  For Foucault, homosexuality offered the self a position from 
which to cultivate a culture and an ethics, one that valorized bodies and pleasures, sexual 
choice, and the pursuit of new “polymorphic, varied, and individually modulated” 
relationships of self-to-self and self-to-society (Foucault 1996a; 310, 312).  “Becoming 
gay” implied this sort of work on the self: an askesis, or technology, by which the self 
might strive toward ethical subjectivity.  
Foucault's project of gay becoming is discernible throughout several key 
interviews with the French and American gay press: “Friendship as a Way of Life,” 
conducted by Rene de Coccatty, Jean Danet, and Jean le Bitoux for Le Gai Pied in April 
1981; “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will,” conducted by Gilles Barbadette for 
Christopher Street in October 1981; “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,” conducted by James 
O'Higgins for Salmagundi in March 1982; “History and Homosexuality” (originally 
“L'Homosexualité dans l'antiquité”), conducted by J.P Joecker, M. Ouerd and A. Sanzio 
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for Masques in Spring 1982; and “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” conducted by 
Bob Gallagher and Alexander Wilson in June 1982 and published in The Advocate 
August 7, 1984.  As I shall demonstrate, Foucault aligned becoming gay with askesis in 
these interviews.  As askesis, “becoming gay” represented ethical work on and with the 
body toward ethical subjectivation.  
In his late-life interviews with the gay press, Foucault consistently evidenced an 
interest in queering—or productively disrupting, with reference to same-sex sexual 
practices—discourses of sexuality.  More, he insisted that sexual choices were capable of 
creating culture(s) and ethics.  De-centering sexuality, the eroticization of the entire body, 
had the potential to create new forms of pleasure.  Those forms of pleasure, Foucault 
insisted, had the potential to create new relationships and communities, new ways of life. 
He identified the creative disruption implicit in the pursuit of these pleasures as 
“becoming gay.”  Foucault's interviews with the gay press establish the extent to which 
Foucault connected becoming gay with askeses, technologies intended to cultivate an 
ethical relationship of the self to the self.
The earliest of these interviews, “Friendship as a Way of Life” (April 1981), 
explicitly links “becoming homosexual” with askesis (Foucault 1996a, 310).  It's worth 
noting that Foucault did not contextualize askesis within ancient Greece in this interview; 
rather, he defined it in opposition to asceticism: “asceticism as the renunciation of 
pleasure has bad connotations.  But the askesis is something else: it's the work that one 
performs on oneself in order to transform oneself or make the self appear that happily one 
never attains” (Foucault 1996a, 309-310).  (I shall return to the opposition of askesis to 
renunciation and asceticism in my conclusion, with regard to the deliberately secular 
genealogy of askesis.)  However, this work on the self is not singular nor strictly internal; 
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rather, “Friendship” speaks longingly of the new kinds of relationships made possible 
through homosexuality.  Becoming homosexual should involve making oneself 
“infinitely more susceptible to pleasures,” thus escaping (and helping others escape) 
traditional relationship structures (Foucault 1996a, 310).  The question of becoming 
homosexual was, for Foucault, one of a “multiplicity of relationships” – of “what 
relations, through homosexuality, can be established, invented, multiplied and 
modulated?” (Foucault 1996a, 308). Becoming gay as an askesis, then, implied not only 
work on the bodily self, but also work toward new forms of interpersonal relationality.
Foucault expanded on the relational component of becoming homosexual in 
“Social Triumph of the Sexual Will” (Oct 1981).  In this interview, he suggested that gay 
rights—understood simply as the legality of same-sex sexual acts—could not be the 
culmination of gay becoming.  The choices and values implicit in loving someone of the 
same sex, Foucault argued, involved “ a whole series of other values and choices for 
which there are not yet real possibilities” (Foucault 1997a, 157).  “It's not only a matter 
of integrating this strange little practice of making love with someone of the same sex 
into preexisting cultures; it's a matter of constructing [créer] cultural forms” (Foucault 
1997a, 157).  Foucault was adamant that homosexuality-as-becoming had the potential to 
create both culture and ethics that allowed for relationships beyond the marital and 
familial.  
We should fight against the impoverishment of the relational fabric.  We 
should secure the relations of provisional coexistence, adoption...why not? 
– of one adult by another... [W]e should try to imagine and create a new 
relational right that permits all possible types of relations to exist and not 
be prevented, blocked, or annulled by impoverished relational institutions. 
(Foucault 1997a, 158)
Not only did Foucault suggest adoption of adults by adults—an unusually prescriptive 
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element10 in his broadly theoretical work—he implied that these new modes of 
relationality will benefit non-homosexuals as well (1997, 160).  He further noted that 
becoming homosexual must be a new form of askesis, as the ancient Greeks never 
admitted the possibility of adult same-sex love (Foucault 1995, 162).  In these ways, 
“Social Triumph” expanded upon the ethical and cultural potentiality of homosexual 
becoming.  
In “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act” (March 1982), as the title suggests, Foucault 
emphasized the necessity for legal and cultural latitude to make transgressive sexual 
choices.  He distinguished between sexual choices and sexual acts, because “there are a 
sexual acts like rape which should not be permitted whether they involve a man and a 
woman or two men.  I don't think we should have as our objective some sort of absolute 
freedom or total liberty of sexual action” (Foucault 1996b, 324).  However, he 
maintained that regarding freedom of sexual choice, we must be “absolutely intransigent” 
(Foucault 1996b, 324).  Foucault argued that sexual choices were not simply the result of 
physical desires and legal restrictions; rather, sexual behavior is “also the consciousness 
one has of what one is doing, what one makes of the experience, and the value one 
attaches to it” (1996b, 322).  Though he refused to comment on the likelihood of either 
biological predispositions to or social conditioning toward homosexuality, Foucault 
insisted that consciousness of self-as-homosexual involved both personal experience of 
the self and awareness of the self as part of a community (1996b, 323).  This link between 
work toward realizing self-as-gay and homosexuality as culture-generative again 
connects homosexuality, and sexual choice more broadly, to askesis.  
10 In the notes to St. Foucault, Halperin refers Claude Mauriac's memoirs on this point.  Toward the end of 
his life, Foucault inquired as to the procedures—never pursued—for legally adopting Daniel Defert, his 
lover of twenty years (Halperin 1995, 214).  
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“History and Homosexuality” (Spring 1982) is more explicit about positioning the 
need to “set on being gay” in conversation with a classical Greek archive (Foucault 
1996c, 369).  In this interview, Foucault rejected the notion that the Greeks 
unconditionally accepted male homosexuality; he argued that the amount of writing on 
the subject of “man-boy relations”—as opposed to the relative dearth on the subject of 
male-female sexual acts—suggests that “these relations were difficult to accept morally” 
(1996c, 364).  Nevertheless, Foucault argued that these methods of ethically cultivating 
the self through sexual control were creative as well as restrictive.  Contemporary ethical 
cultivation of the self through sexual practices, he suggested, could be likewise 
generative.  “These sexual choices must at the same time be creative ways of life.  To be 
gay means that these choices spread across a whole life” (Foucault 1996c, 369).  One 
must not necessarily engage in same-sex sexual behaviors, he insisted, but ethical 
subjectivity demanded that one “set on being gay” (Foucault 1996c, 370).
Finally, in “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” (June 1982), Foucault 
elaborated on sexual technologies toward becoming an ethical subject.  Specifically, he 
suggested “sadomasochistic eroticism” (hereafter s/m) made possible new forms of 
bodily pleasure.  In the spirit of susceptibility to pleasures, Foucault argued that s/m—
which he explored in an exclusively male homosexual context—decenters sexual activity, 
expanding pleasures beyond the genitals to eroticize the entire body (1996d, 384). 
“These practices are insisting that we can produce pleasure with very odd things, very 
strange parts of our bodies, in very unusual situations” (Foucault 1996d, 384).  More than 
simply discovering new bodily pleasures, however, s/m created a culture, with a location 
(San Francisco) and a (leather) community of its own (Foucault 1996d, 385).  In short, 
s/m's decentralized bodily pleasures created a culture based on the primacy of those 
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pleasures, thus instantiating the creative disruptions of normative sexuality inherent in 
becoming gay.
Throughout his interactions with the American and French gay press, Foucault 
connected gay becoming with a life devoted to work on and with the body.  He suggested 
that this relationship with the self, or rapport à soir, was an ethical one, “which 
determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his 
own actions” (Foucault 1997b, 263).  He argued that the ethical subject should pursue 
bodily pleasures rather than attempt to fit sexual behaviors within a predetermined sexual 
identity.  Sexual choice, he maintained, had the potential to create new modes of culture, 
new kinds of relationships, new locations for kinship and community.  
In the above interviews, Foucault explicitly and implicitly linked the generative 
capacity of an ethical relationship with the bodily self—a relationship cultivated through 
becoming gay—with askesis, a Stoic concept he developed more fully in The Use of  
Pleasure.  This, I suggest, demonstrates a concern with queering: the potential for same-
sex sexual choices to productively disrupt conventional modes of sexuality.  In my next 
segment, I shall demonstrate the ways in which Foucault employed The Use of Pleasure 
and The Care of the Self to provide a historical precedent for the creative-disruptive 
potential of same-sex sexual choices and, more broadly, non-normative sexual ethics.
Historicizing Work on and with the Body:  The Use of Pleasure  and  The Care of the Self  
In this segment, I explore the second two volumes of The History of Sexuality, 
paying particular attention to the ethical exploration of male-male sexual relationships.  I 
highlight areas in which Foucault demonstrates the moral and political utility of sexual 
askeses both for the individual and for the community.  I argue that his focus on same-sex 
sexual choices in aid of constitution of self as ethical bodily subject demonstrated an 
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interest in queering—or productively disrupting—historical narratives of sexuality.  I 
suggest that Foucault intended this queering of historical sexuality narratives to support 
his project of homosexual becoming.
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self diverged sharply from Foucault's 
initial intentions for the History of Sexuality project.  Whereas The Will to Knowledge 
demonstrated post-Enlightenment constructions of power/knowledge regulatory systems 
through discourses of normalcy and deviance, the series' second and third volumes 
focused upon the relationship of the self to the self that results in moral systems, 
specifically in the context of ancient Greece.  Foucault's professedly increased interest in 
subjectivity11 over sexuality explains his departure from modern discursive analysis, but 
not his subsequent archive selection.  I offer two possible explanations for the shift, both 
of which have bearing on the project of becoming gay: the potential of Greek and 
Hellenistic sources to demonstrate non-normalizing codes of conduct; and the 
productively disruptive examples of ethical struggles provided by these sources.
In his 1995 St. Foucault, David Halperin suggests that Foucault shifted both his 
archive and his focus because these classical texts provide “concrete examples of a 
discourse that could construct norms without producing effects of normalization” (109). 
Halperin continues, “the study of Greek sexual morality discloses...the possibility of an 
ascetic discipline whose effect—unlike that of the modern disciplines—is not to 
normalize but, if anything, to marginalize: that is, to queer” (1995, 111; Halperin's 
emphasis).  The technologies of ethical self-improvement (askeses) were adopted only by 
11 In a public lecture at the University of Southern California in October 1981, Foucault claimed a 
growing interest in how “a human being turns him- or herself into a subject” (Foucault et al. 1988, 3). 
In April 1983, he moreover indicated a waning interest in focusing exclusively on sexuality: “I am 
much more interested in problems about techniques of the self and things like that than sex...sex is 
boring” (Foucault 1997b, 253).
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male elites; thus, Halperin argues, the purpose of these ethical guidelines was to 
encourage men to distinguish rather than normalize themselves in relation to their 
communities (1995, 111; see also Foucault 1997b, 254).   Non-normalizing ethical codes 
of sexual conduct would complement Foucault's project of gay becoming.
I concur with Halperin's hypothesis, but would add that Foucault was also 
invested in disrupting a particular intellectual narrative: that of unqualified acceptance of 
homosexuality by the ancient Greeks, and undeniably condemnation of homosexuality by 
the early Christians.  “It makes no sense to say that homosexuality was tolerated by the 
Greeks,” Foucault insisted (1996c, 363).  This is because, as he demonstrated in Will to  
Knowledge, the idea of a static sexual identity is a decidedly modern concept.  The 
Greeks did not have a concept of sexuality congruent with post-Enlightenment thinking. 
More importantly, however, same-sex sexual activity was not met with unconditional 
approbation in ancient Greek context.  The reason there are numerous texts on moral 
comportment in man-boy sexual relations, Foucault suggested, “is very much the fact that 
these relations were difficult to accept morally” (1996c, 364).  The Use of Pleasure and 
The Care of the Self demonstrate textual evidence for ethical struggles with male-male 
sexual activities, but also subtly argue that these struggles were productively disruptive, 
technologies by which men distinguished themselves ethical subjects and better citizens. 
The creative disruption instantiated by askesis is, I suggest, directly contributed to 
Foucault's exhortation to become gay.
Foucault's concern with “becoming gay” is discernible throughout the final 
published volumes of The History of Sexuality, marking a discursive shift for the series 
from universalized codes of conduct toward the self's relationship with self.  Through his 
engagement with classical Greek texts on sexual morality, Foucault demonstrated not 
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only that the Greeks had no concept of homosexuality as sexual identity, but that male-
male sexual behaviors were a matter of moral concern and vehicle for self-betterment. 
The struggle for sexual self-control and the choices made regarding sexual behaviors 
extended into every aspect of the citizen's life, thus illustrating the political and ethical 
utility of “becoming homosexual” (1996c, 369).  
  Foucault's focus for the second two volumes of the Sexuality series was the 
“history of the manner in which pleasure, desires, and sexual behaviors have been 
problematized, reflected upon and thought about in Antiquity in relation to a certain art of 
living” (Foucault 1996e, 456).  This art of living, or technology of the self, was askesis.  
Though he first theorized the concept of askesis in his 1982 University of Vermont 
lecture series,12 Foucault only fully developed the concept in the second volume of The 
History of Sexuality.  
The Use of Pleasure explores the aesthetic cultivation of the self.  In his April 
1983 working sessions with Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, Foucault reiterated his 
interest in the non-normalizing function of ancient Greek askeses.  These aesthetic 
technologies did not meet with unqualified approbation: as Foucault noted, “pagan ethics 
was not at all liberal, tolerant, and so on, as it was supposed to be” (1997b, 254; see also 
257).  However, the asketical lifestyle was a “personal choice for a small elite13...the will 
to live a beautiful life, and to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence” (Foucault 
1997b, 254).  To pursue askesis, then, was to dedicate one's life to rigorous codes of 
sexual morality meant to set the citizen apart from and above his community.  An 
12 Collected and published as Technologies of the Self (Foucault et al. 1988).  
13 It's worth noting that this elite was entirely male – Foucault presented askesis unapologetically as 
“ethics for men” (Foucault 1985, 22).  I return to Foucault's masculinist theorizations of a universal 
subject in my conclusion to this section.
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asketical mastery of the self was a “personal choice, aesthetics of existence,”  but 
ultimately improved the citizen's ability to “take care of the city, of his companions” 
(1997b, 260).  Thus askesis, as Foucault theorized it in The Use of Pleasure, comprised a 
tekhnē tou biou [art of life] (1997b, 259).  
The Care of the Self, by contrast, demonstrated a shift toward a hermeneutics of 
the self, one that lay for the most part outside sexual behaviors (Foucault 1997b, 255). 
Inasmuch as the archive for this volume dealt with sexual acts, the texts conveyed an 
increased concerns about the dangers of the flesh (Foucault 1997b, 258).  The 
hermeneutics of the self diverged from askesis, particularly as it approached the 
normalizing discourses of early Christianity.  Moreover, sexual ethics in the first and 
second century CE focused less on acts and more on desires.  At this point in the 
genealogy, sexuality was understood as passivity, rather than as the activity it represented 
in Stoic context (1997b, 259).  More broadly, care of the self was for sake of the self, 
rather than to make that self and his community more beautiful.  The Care of the Self  
detailed the shift of concerns for ethical subjectivity from specifically sexual to more 
broadly social arenas, noted an increased sense of danger about sexual activity and 
morality, and demonstrated a move toward institutionalized and normalizing systems of 
sexual regulations.
Foucault does not strictly establish a declension model between the two volumes, 
but does imply that individual subjectivity suffered with increased external regulations of 
sexual conduct.  Ethical self-cultivation interrogated the self, called the self's actions to 
mind, and conditioned that self for right, moral, ethical behaviors.  Foucault's work on the 
constitution of the self as an ethical, embodied subject suggested that institutional sexual 
interdictions were unnecessary in light of and perhaps less effective than the bodily and 
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spiritual discipline of the self by the self.  Askesis, in particular, illustrated that a constant 
struggle for self-mastery was both possible and ethical.   In the final volumes of The 
History of Sexuality, readers have an example of, if not a methodology for, a system of 
individualized—potentially queer—sexual ethics.
Foucault's project of gay becoming was more in keeping with askesis than a 
hermeneutics of the self.  The contemporary project of homosexual askesis, however, 
emphasized the pursuit of new bodily pleasures rather than the strict regulation of sexual 
practices.  Again, Foucault acknowledged that becoming gay was not equivalent to 
classical askesis: there was no space in these Stoic discourses for a sexual and romantic 
relationship between two adult male citizens (1996a, 162).  But both the askesis of 
antiquity and contemporary gay becoming demonstrate the creative disruptions made 
possible by non-normalizing codes of moral sexual conduct.  These ethical systems are 
intended to set the individual apart, but also improve the self and ultimately generate new 
pleasures and new modes of life.  
However, these ethoi are not without their limitations.  Gay becoming as askesis  
provides a useful analytical model for thinking about homosexuality: in Foucauldean 
terms, homosexuality is not a sexual identity but rather work on and with the body toward 
understanding and betterment of the self.  Becoming homosexual, then, expands the 
potential for bodily pleasures and creates new forms of community that might prove 
liberative (or, in Jantzen's terms, flourishing) for those excluded or pathologized by 
existent forms of sexual identity or communities.  But gay askesis is not universally 
liberative, despite Foucault's presentation of a universal subject throughout his interviews 
and the second two volumes of The History of Sexuality.  As I shall demonstrate in my 
next segment, homosexual askesis occludes concerns of gender, queer bodies, and 
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religion.  
Occlusions: Gender, Queer Bodies, and Religion
I suggested in the previous segment that The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the 
Self  provided an historical precedent for Foucault's project of gay becoming.  In what 
follows, I locate the occlusions of Foucault's project: specifically those of queer bodies 
and of religiosity, both of which challenge the voluntarism of becoming homosexual.  I 
suggest that contemporary gay becoming, like Stoic askeses, is a radically voluntaristic, 
masculinist, and secularist ethical system.  
In an interview with Rux Martin (October 1982), Foucault explained that his 
purpose in writing The History of Sexuality was to show that we “are much freer than 
they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up 
at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and 
destroyed," (1988, 10).  Classical askesis, as he presents it in The Use of Pleasure, is 
performed by the male citizen on himself, presumably for the betterment of his friends 
and community; but his household, friends, and community did not, as Foucault presents 
them, contribute to these constitutions of self.  Likewise, Foucault fails to problematize 
the constraints upon “becoming gay” in contemporary societies – for example, class, 
race, education, physical ability, geographic location, and—as I shall demonstrate in a 
moment—gender.14  These constraints, I suggest, problematize the radical voluntarism of 
becoming homosexual.
Gay becoming, as Foucault outlined it in the aforementioned interviews, 
14 Lin Foxhall discusses the gendered decontextualization of Foucault's History of Sexuality at length – see 
“Pandora Unbound: A Feminist Critique of Foucault's History of Sexuality.”  See also Judith Butler's 
Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” for a critique on the radical voluntarism at play 
in Foucault's later works.  
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suggested a radical degree of voluntarism in cultivation of the self while failing to 
meaningfully engage with gender concerns.  In at least three of his interviews with the 
gay press from 1981 to 1982, Foucault consistently discussed becoming gay without 
mention of cultural restrictions of the project.  In five of these interviews, he was 
questioned about the gendered implications of askesis and/or becoming gay; his answers 
were by turns perfunctory, cryptic, and dismissive.  Though these interviews are a limited 
archive, they are the sole textual exploration of Foucault's notion of gay becoming and 
the project's link to askesis.  Given Foucault's (again, limited) theorizations of becoming 
gay throughout the interviews, I suggest that the project was inherently masculinist and 
radically voluntarist.15
We can detect a radically voluntarist aspect of Foucault's gay becoming in at least 
three interviews: “Friendship as a Way of Life;” “The Social Triumph of the Sexual 
Will;” and “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity.”  “Friendship” demonstrates the level 
of exuberant voluntarism perceptible in the introduction to The Use of Pleasure, as well 
as in Technologies of the Self.  Homosexuality represents the possibility of establishing, 
inventing, and modulating a multiplicity of relationships (Foucault 1996a, 308).  The 
question, Foucault suggested, is precisely “what new game can we invent?” (1996a, 312). 
In “Friendship,” at least, there is no theorization of the restrictions placed upon individual 
reinventions of interpersonal relationality.
“Social Triumph” does address to some extent the issue of legal constraints.  Foucault 
does not dismiss civil rights so much as insist that homosexuality cannot rest there.
15 See, for example, Butler's Bodies That Matter on this point.  Butler theorizes the constraints 
heteronormativity places on queer performativity via Lacan in direct response to what she feels is 
Foucault's overestimation of subjective voluntarism (1992, 98).  While I shall not argue for levels of 
cultural or social constriction comparable to what Butler suggests, I do concur with Butler that 
Foucault's askesis and his gay becoming are perhaps overly voluntaristic.  
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[A] right, in its real effects, is much more linked to attitudes and patterns 
of behavior that to legal formations.  There can be discrimination against 
homosexuals even if such discriminations are prohibited by law.  It is 
therefore necessary to struggle to establish homosexual lifestyles, 
existential choices [d' choix d'existence] in which sexual relations with 
people of the same sex will be important.  (1997a, 157)
There is acknowledgement that “attitudes and patterns of behavior” regarding 
homosexuality must be shifted, but no theorization as to how those behaviors might 
constrain gay becoming. I agree that a discourse of gay becoming must expand beyond 
the juridical; but I feel this rhetoric does not go far enough to demonstrate the material 
realities of the project.  To illustrate, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” extols the 
subversive potentialities of s/m communities to expand pleasures and form new 
relationships, but fails to acknowledge the cultural and legal restrictions such 
communities faced (and face) in San Fransisco and elsewhere (Foucault 1996d, 385).  
Foucault reads the constructed nature of sexuality as indicative of a possibility to 
radical change what sexuality does.  “Sexuality is something we ourselves create—it is 
our own creation, [and]...a possibility for creative life” (Foucault 1996d, 382).  I do not 
disagree.  However, I take issue with the degree of voluntarism implied in gay becoming. 
Foucault makes “gay” sound like the best, most ethical choice regarding sexuality, but 
fails to engage with the experiences of those  outside “gay,” for whom sexual outsider-
ness might be or seem less of a choice: specifically intersex and transpeople, whose 
gender identity is ambiguous and/or intentionally mutable.  Foucault also does not 
address the space created for the kinds of disruptions he favors by legal work toward 
securing sexual rights.  Again, I agree that queer becoming cannot and should not rest at 
merely legalizing behaviors; nor am I arguing against queer's creatively disruptive 
potential.   Indeed, I shall discuss religious instantiations of such productive 
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insubordinations in my next section.  Nevertheless, I cannot argue for unconstrained 
subjectivity, particularly to the extent of unmindfulness regarding those whom our 
projects-of-becoming exclude.  Many factors, including but by no means limited to 
gender identity, constrain and shape our agency, limiting the voluntarism with which we 
may work on and with our bodies toward ethical subjectivity.
Foucault's most glaring omission from gay becoming is gender concerns – 
specifically those of women, though intersex and transpeople are likewise excluded by 
this masculinism.  Interviewers asked questions regarding the place of women in askesis  
and gay becoming in “Friendship as a Way of Life,” “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,” 
“History and Homosexuality,” “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” and “Sex, Power, and the 
Politics of Identity.”  In each interview, Foucault dismissed or evaded the questions.  The 
evidence for a masculinist bias for gay becoming lies in the tension created by these 
dismissals and evasions.  I am not calling Foucault a misogynist.  I do not find evidence 
for a hatred of women either in his published works or in his interviews and lectures. 
What these sources do demonstrate is a reverberating silence: women are discussed 
briefly if at all, and only in relationship to men.16  More, Foucault proposed 
homosexuality as a nominally universal potentiality but demonstrated an interest only in 
specifically gay male becoming.  
“Friendship as a Way of Life” contains Foucault's most substantial engagement 
with gay becoming as it relates to women. He was asked: “Women might object: what do 
men together have to win compared to the relations between a man and a woman or 
between two women?” (citation).  Foucault's response was to suggest that female 
friendship has historically created space for women to be physically affectionate with 
16 See, for example, the limitation of women to matrimony in both The Use of Pleasure and The Care of  
the Self, as Foxhall argues in “Pandora Unbound.”  
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each other, whereas “man's body has been forbidden to other men in a much more drastic 
way” (1996a, 311).  He referenced Faderman's Surpassing the Love of Men regarding 
historical evidence for female homosociality, but did not discuss contemporary female 
friendship or, more to the point in a discussion about gay becoming, lesbianism.  He 
devoted six sentences to women's access to each other's bodies, mostly to highlight the 
denial of men's bodies to men.  This is the deepest and longest engagement with any 
question of gender posed to him throughout the interviews in question.
“Sexual Choice, Sexual Act” contains a more puzzling engagement with gender 
concerns.  In answer to a question regarding the usefulness of distinguishing between 
male and female homosexualities, Foucault responded, “all I can do is explode with 
laughter” (1996b, 325).  When the interviewer asked for clarification, Foucault replied 
that “the distinction offered doesn't seem to me convincing, in terms of what I observe in 
the behavior of lesbian women,” (1996b, 325).  Foucault suggested that different 
pressures—presumably social?—face male and female homosexuals when coming out, 
and that radical feminists were unlikely to find sympathy in international intellectual 
communities.  This question received four relatively short perfunctory sentences in 
response.  Several questions later, Foucault mentioned that female same-sex sexual 
behaviors are more restricted than male-male sex, but failed to qualify the statement.  In 
an interview in which most of his answers were several paragraphs long, Foucault's 
engagement with questions of gender was both dismissive and brief.
The interviewers for “History and Homosexuality” pushed questions of gender 
during this piece; here again, Foucault was dismissive, and unlike “Sexual Choice,” 
explicitly so.  When asked if “taking up again the Greek ideal, masculine gay society of 
the 20th century...legitimates a misogyny that rejects women,” Foucault denied the 
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possibility, replying only that “Greek myth” influences behaviors-of-becoming only 
inasmuch as the subject allowed (1996c, 365).  He did not explore the effect the exclusion 
or marginalization of women in this theory would have on women who might want to 
become gay.  He turned the conversation toward female homosociality, again referencing 
Faderman's Surpassing the Love of Men and its characterizations of female relationships. 
Foucault cites Faderman's unwillingness to explore whether these female friendships had 
sexual elements, but evades the question of asketical misogyny.  Interviewers then asked 
whether studying female homosociality without engaging the question of sexual 
behaviors “confines women to the domain of feeling, with its eternal stereotypes: their 
freedom of contact, their free emotions, their friendships” (Foucault 1996c, 365). 
Foucault explicitly refused to engage this line of inquiry.  He acknowledged that his 
response might seem “lax,” but suggested that these “phenomena”—presumably female 
relationships—were “so complex and pre-coded by grids of analysis already in place that 
one must accept certain methods” (Foucault 1996c, 366).  That is, Foucault suggested 
(again, briefly, in an interview where responses were usually quite long) that those 
interested in analyzing female friendship should keep the current categories of analysis. 
When questioned about whether we can or should speak of a “female gay culture,” 
Foucault replied only that homosexuality had a much stricter meaning in France.  The 
extent to which Foucault appeared uninterested in the applicability to women of gay 
becoming or of askesis is most evident in “History and Homosexuality.” 
“On a Genealogy of Ethics” and “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” both 
use women as counterpoints to theorizing about male homosexual behaviors or 
becomings.  Regarding askesis, Foucault suggests that man-boy sexual activities were 
morally troubling to the Greeks based on the fact that it was discussed extensively. 
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“Because if there were no problem, they would speak of this kind of love in the same 
terms as love between men and women,” Foucault suggested (1997b, 257).  In response 
to a question about the extent to which lesbian s/m might create ways for “dominated 
subjects to formulate their own languages,” Foucault responded briefly about the 
theoretical nature of resistance and another unclear reference to Faderman's book to the 
effect that lesbianism creates cultural space outside relationships with men.  To a follow-
up question  about the degree to which lesbian s/m challenges the “dominant discourse,” 
Foucault replied that lesbian s/m helped combat stereotypes of lesbianism, specifically of 
“femininity” and “antimale attitude” (1996d, 387).  He mentions Gayle Rubin's article on 
the Catacombs, but does not mention women's (admittedly limited) presence or activity in 
San Francisco s/m subcultures (1996d, 385).  These later essays demonstrate Foucault's 
tendency to engage with gender concerns only insofar as women serve as the foil for 
men, male friendship, and male homosexuality.
Given his extensive refusal to engage gender concerns and his positing of a 
markedly male universal subject, I suggest that both askesis and gay becoming are 
gender-blind projects.  Foucault consistently and emphatically refused to engage with 
questions concerning gender.  When pressed, his responses were brief, dismissive, and 
cryptic.  Foucault's late-life interviews with the gay press are narrowed against gender 
concerns – ostensibly present universal subject; but in fact offering demonstrably male 
subject extrapolated to exclusion of all other bodily experiences.  This is a frustrating 
theoretical moment: Foucault's appeal in gay becoming to a universal subject provides a 
useful model for thinking differently about sexuate bodies, and specifically about work 
on and with the body toward ethical subjectivity.  But, as I have suggested, the 
masculinism and radical voluntarism of homosexual becoming limits the liberative 
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quality of Foucault's project.
David Halperin challenges Foucault's gender exclusivity in his Saint Foucault, 
though he retains Foucault's voluntarism to a large extent.  Halperin's project is at least 
nominally more broad, including “anyone who is or who feels marginalized because of 
her or his sexual practices” (Halperin 1995, 62).  Halperin explicitly discusses both the 
role of lesbians in queer becoming and the historical tensions between lesbians and gay 
men.  More, if we take Halperin at his word in this passage, queerness can and should 
include bisexuals, the s/m community, the non-monogamous, and other sexual 
transgressives.  Halperin also addresses the political location of queer becoming, 
acknowledging that queers do experience distinct “political disabilities” and “forms of 
social disqualification” that might render sexual identity a legally useful if necessarily 
limited concept (1995, 65).  
In many ways, becoming queer addresses the exclusivity of Foucault's gay 
becoming. However, Halperin's queer becoming does not serve as a comprehensive 
corrective to the occlusions of Foucault's project.  Most troubling is Halperin's 
ontologization of homosexuality, upon which his theorizations of queerness are 
predicated.17  While Halperin makes perfunctory mention of the complications of gender 
and race to the political and ethical utility of queerness, he fails to address either concern 
17 To wit: “one can't become homosexual, strictly speaking: either one is or one isn't” (Halperin 1995, 79). 
This sentence troubled me more than anything else in St. Foucault – which is impressive for a book that 
opines at length about the transformative potentialities of anal fisting.  Halperin does not qualify his 
statement.  He does not indicate what does or does not make one gay.  Is it gender?  Is it sexual object 
choice?  Is it politics?  Some combination thereof?  Something else altogether?  We're not told.  This is 
an almost phenomenological understanding of homosexuality, ala Otto: if we are gay, we must know it. 
If we are not, Halperin's meaning must needs be beyond us.  Affect aside, this is an irrefutably binary 
understanding of human sexuality: gay/not gay.  This ontologization of homosexuality—the idea that 
there is something that homosexuality is, and therefore many things that homosexuality is not, leaving 
no space between sexual poles—is deeply problematic, and frankly counter to Foucault's 
conceptualization of both homosexuality in particular and sexuality itself at large.  I find myself 
productively disrupted: the expansion of gay becoming to efforts toward queerness is, I think, a 
necessary and important one.  However, Halperin underwrites his theorizations with masculinist and 
essentialist understanding of the nature of homosexuality.
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in depth.  More, he consistently undermines queer's professed inclusivity.  s/m and its 
transgressive sexual practices are the sole invention of gay men in Halperin's account; 
and, as with Foucault, discussions of fisting are limited to anal activity (1995, 96).  This 
is an exclusivist and ahistorical claim.  There is no consideration of non-penetrative sex
—which is often a component of s/m practices—or of the different, no less transgressive, 
role fisting plays in lesbian sex.  Further, there is no mention of early role women played 
in San Fransisco leather communities.18  Halperin explicitly accuses bisexuals of 
providing means by which to “de-gay gayness” (1995, 65).  For all its acknowledgement 
of political disabilities, queer as Halperin uses it is monolithic: there is no engagement 
with varying degrees of legal or social restraints with regard to sexual identities or 
practices.  There is even less engagement with concerns of race, class, education, physical 
ability, or geographical location.19  
Most significantly for my project, Halperin's corrective to Foucault's project—that 
is, Halperin's insistence on queerness rather than homosexuality—emphasizes 
transgressive pleasures to the exclusion of queer bodies.  This is not to minimize the 
disruptive potentiality of transgressive sexual choice; however, limiting queerness to 
sexual practices occludes those bodies or gender identities outside the “acceptable,” 
specifically intersex and transgender persons.  This, of course, raises questions of self-
recognition, as not all transgender (particularly transsexual) persons would recognize 
themselves as queer, nor would they find the identification of themselves as such life-
giving (cf. Prosser).  But as Raven Kaldera emphasizes in my next section, transgendered 
individuals do queer understandings of the way gender work, often only by their bodily 
18 See Rubin's article on the Catacombs and her explicit mention of Pat Califia's participation.  
19 cf. Halberstam on the normative bias toward urban settings as queer spaces, which she calls 
“metronormativity” (2005, 12).
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presence.  Transgender identity often involves a visible cultivation of the bodily self as 
queer, which might bolster and broadened Halperin's argument.  Emphasizing choice to 
the exclusion of bodies limits the utility of queer as a corrective to homosexual 
becoming.  
In addition to the exclusion of queer bodies, Halperin limits his project by 
excluding (as Foucault did) religion as a viable queer askesis.  More than Foucault, 
Halperin emphasizes askesis as a spiritual20 undertaking.  However, Halperin fails to 
connect the ethics of askesis to a language of spirituality.  Queer politics is “a kind of 
spiritual exercise, a modern practice of the self;” but we're not told what kind of 
spirituality is operative in queer politics (Halperin 1995, 101).  Halperin is not wrong to 
argue that Foucault intended askesis and gay becoming as secular projects; Foucault is 
explicit on that point.  Stoic systems were of interest because they based their ethics on 
civil concerns; cultivation of the self departed from askesis as it approached 
Christianity.21  Contemporary gay becomings resembled ancient askesis because  “most 
of us no longer believe that ethics is founded in religion” (Foucault 1997b, 255).   (I'm 
not sure who “most of us” are, though I'm certain “us” includes Halperin and excludes 
roughly half of the United States.)   Whereas Foucauldean gay becoming distanced 
askesis from conversion to the self, Halperin seems to elide the two concepts: 
“homosexuality for Foucault is a spiritual exercise” (1995, 78). Again, however, the 
spirituality of Halperin's queer becoming is avowedly secular.  
I do not take issue with the professed secularism of Halperin's project, nor to his 
20 There is a certain amount of slippage in Halperin with regard to ethics, spirituality, and religion.  If I 
read him correctly, ethics and spirituality are nearly interchangeable, whereas religion implies 
unnecessary and anachronistic institutionalized moral codes.  
21 Foucault did not imply that early Christians did not self-cultivate, a point to which I shall return in the 
conclusion to this section.  However, he does intimate that Christianity presented a more normalizing 
discourse.
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emphasis on the asketical potential of historical scholarship.  I do wonder, however, at the 
deliberate exclusion of religion or religiosity from queer askesis.  “It is no longer divinity 
but history...that guarantees us an experience of the Other at the core of our own 
subjectivity and brings it about that any direct encounter with the self must also be a 
confrontation with the not-self” (Halperin 1995, 104).  For Halperin, history represents 
the height of intellectual and spiritual cultivation of self (1995, 105).  
I do think that history can surface both internal alterity and the alterity of a nation 
to itself.  Likewise, the study of history may serve as catalyst for personal or national 
transformation.  But so, too, may religion: Saba Mahmood's work, for example, 
demonstrates the role of bodily devotional practice in ethical self-cultivation.  I am 
unclear as to why history necessarily excludes divinity or the relationship of self-to-self 
as a relationship of self-to-divine.  
As Jeremy Carrette demonstrates in his 2000 Foucault and Religion, religion and 
spirituality22 were common themes throughout Foucault's work.  Carrette suggests that 
Foucault “continually drew religion into his work – he recognised religion as a major part 
of the 'history of the present'” (2000, 2).  He notes a renewed analytical engagement with 
Christianity in Foucault's fourth, unpublished volume of The History of Sexuality, 
allegedly titled Confessions of the Flesh.  However, Carrette contends, “Foucault's late 
work on Christianity was not a sudden or abrupt turn to religion;” rather, he argues that 
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self  “can be seen as an extended preparation for 
the themes of sexual austerity in Christianity” (2000, 24).
22 With Carrette, I note verbal slippage in Foucault's work between the terms religion and spirituality.  As 
per Carrette, religion seems to indicate “overall phenomenological term to refer to any institutionalized 
faith tradition, though this predominantly means institutionalised Christianity” (2000, 6).  Spirituality 
“appears to refer to any religious faith, but is used [by Foucault]...to avoid the word 'religion' and 
strategically disrupt traditional religious meaning” (Carrette 2000, 6).
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To read Christianity as the specter haunting The History of Sexuality is perhaps to 
miss the point.  As I have argued, I believe Foucault's asketical project in The Use of  
Pleasure and The Care of the Self was, at least in part, in service to his contemporary 
project of homosexual becoming – a project that did not so much respond to as dismiss 
Christianity and religion more broadly.   Christianity absolutely represented both 
normalizing moral discourses and subject-forming bodily disciplines within Foucault's 
work.  However, the asketical project was, as I have demonstrated, more concerned with 
the socially disruptive quality of pre-Christian same-sex sexual behaviors and the 
productive nature of that transgressive disruption for both the subject and his society.
Carrette nevertheless rightly notes religion's lingering presence throughout not 
only The History of Sexuality, but Foucault's life-work.  Religious discourse, religious 
institutions, and religious practice all function in Foucault's analyses as apparatuses of 
subjectivation.  The key difference between Foucault's reading of 
spirituality/religion/Christianity and that of queer askesis, I would suggest, lies in 
engagement with the body.  Whereas Christianity/religion, for Foucault, creates subjects 
through renunciation, discipline, and silencing of the passive (male) body, 
askesis/becoming homosexual affirms and amplifies the active (male) body and its 
pleasures.  
Foucault's continued engagement with embodied religion and religious bodies 
might provide insight into his formulation of homosexual becoming as a secular project. 
Both religious practice and asketical ethics constitute subjects.  However, as Foucault 
theorized it, religion (broadly read here as Christianity) forms subjects by grafting the 
soul on the body.  In this reading of religion, the soul lacks a metaphysical referent: it is a 
disciplinary power/knowledge order that imprisons the body (Carrette 2000; 124, 115). 
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Foucault suggested that religion disciplines passive bodies, making them docile.  These 
docile bodies renounce themselves—their flesh and pleasures—in confession, which 
Foucault considered among the earliest paradigms for regimes of bodily discipline and 
self-mastery (Carrette 2000, 118).  Confession and monasticism constitute the self 
through the negation of bodily desire (Carrette 2000, 112).  Thus “Christianity 
paradoxically constructs a self in the very sacrificing or silencing of the embodied self” 
(Carrette 2000, 42).
Both classical askesis and homosexual becoming, on the other hand, are grounded 
in the affirmation rather than renunciation or silencing of the body and its pleasures. 
Whereas Foucault understood Christianity and religion more broadly as bodily disciplines 
that imprisoned the body, becoming homosexual was intended as a liberatory project. 
Queer askesis cultivates active bodily subjects, rather than passive, docile selves.  Finally, 
the disciplining of bodies through confession and renunciation was meant to establish and 
maintain civil order.  Foucault intended homosexual becoming to disrupt and re-imagine 
societal constructs, particularly those of sexual identity and relationality.  For these 
reasons, Foucault conceptualized becoming homosexual as a deliberately secular project. 
As I have demonstrated, however, neither Foucauldean homosexual becoming nor 
Halperin's queer becoming account for queer—that is, intersex (gender-indeterminate) 
and transgender (gender-ambiguous or -mutable)—bodies.  Further, as I shall argue in the 
next chapter, Kaldera's work toward ethical cultivating himself is done for explicitly 
religious reasons.  Foucault's queer askesis moreover does not incorporate religiosity, nor 
does his theorization of religion allow for divine presence (a point to which I shall return 
in my third section).  Thus, while the model provides analytical insight into ethical work 
on and with the body, Foucault's homosexual becoming fails to fully account for 
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Kaldera's bodily self-cultivation.  In my next section, I shall suggest that the knowledge 
created by being-in-(queer)-body, or bodily noesis, complements and enhances Kaldera's 
work on and with his body (askesis).  This illustrates the  manner in which the chiasmus 
of bodily noesis and queer askesis, manifested as religion, can be used to create liberative 
meaning of and for queer bodies.  
To review: in this section, I have argued that the Foucauldean project of 
homosexual becoming helps us think about the ways in which transgressive work on and 
with the sexuate body may productively disrupt sexual discourse.  I detailed Foucault's 
project of becoming homosexual as he introduced it in interviews with the French and 
American gay press from April 1981 to June 1982.  I suggested that The Use of Pleasure 
and The Care of the Self historicize the project of ethical self-subjectivation through 
asketical work on and with the body.  I argued that while becoming homosexual is an 
effective liberatory project in many ways, Foucault's theorizations are masculinist and 
secularist, which challenges the radical voluntarism of the project.  As a result, Foucault 
occludes both queer bodies and religion from homosexual becoming.  I offered brief 
suggestions as to why Foucault might have formulated becoming homosexual as a 
secularist project, but ultimately concluded that the model was insufficient to encompass 
Raven Kaldera's (religious) work on and with his own (queer) body.  In my next section, I 
suggest that Kaldera's knowledge created by being-in-(queer)-body, or bodily noesis, 
complements and expands the religious work he does and has done on and with his body. 
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CHAPTER TWO
THIRD SEX SHAMANISM: “UNMANLY” RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
I suggested in my previous section that Raven Kaldera's work on and with his 
body both confirms and challenges Foucault's model of becoming homosexual. 
Foucault's insistence on the transformative potentiality of sexual transgression provides 
insight into Kaldera's own queer askesis.  However, the masculinism, secularism, and 
radical voluntarism of Foucault's project all exclude Kaldera from becoming homosexual. 
Foucault's model provides an analytical framework for Kaldera's ethical bodily 
subjectivation: Kaldera, like Foucault, makes it possible to think differently about sexuate 
bodies, and to imagine broader possibilities for what those bodies may signify and 
accomplish.  But homosexual becoming is insufficient (or, perhaps more accurately, not 
intended) to encompass religious work done on and with queer bodies.  Thus I argue that 
Kaldera's bodily ethics incorporates queer askesis, but also bodily noesis: knowledge 
about the self in relationship to divinity, created by the experience of being in a queer 
body.  
I draw the term noesis from William James' theorizations of mysticism in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience.  In James' typology, the noetic (or knowledge-creating) 
quality of a religious experience was one of four marks characterizing an experience as 
mystical.  In discussing Kaldera's bodily noesis, however, I am not limiting my 
engagement to mystical experiences – though Kaldera's encounters with Hela could 
certainly be considered mystical experiences.   Rather, I suggest that the experience of 
being-in-body can itself be noetic, by which I mean bodily-being can (seem to) create 
knowledge both about the self and about the divine.  This noesis can—and in Kaldera's 
case, does—inform gender identity and religious practice.  
Bodily noesis presents itself as recognition of the self in divinity: not as idolatry 
or even necessarily anthropomorphism, but rather as an understanding of divinity that 
honors the sexuate self as sacred, that affirms the knowledge created by being-in-body. 
The desire for a deity who reflects bodily knowledge is not new, of course; the push for 
Goddess imagery played (and continues to play) a key part in feminist and womanist 
thea/ologies.23  I shall return to this desire for divine reflection in my discussion of 
Jantzen.  Bodily noesis, in its recognition of knowledge created about the self and the 
divine by the experience of bodily being, may then inform askesis, work on and with the 
body.  This is, I would argue, the case with Kaldera.  
In its emphasis on individual affective experience, bodily noesis can certainly be 
read as a phenomenological category of analysis.  I certainly intend noesis to engage with 
personal religious and bodily experiences, but am reluctant to categorize it as 
phenomenological.  My reluctance stems from phenomenology's investment in 
intentionality.24  On this point, noesis should not, at the very least, be read in 
psychoanalytical terms.  I am less concerned with intentionality than with application: 
that is, my concern is the ways in which the noetic quality of being-in-body informs work 
23 See, for example, Ntozake Shange's poem, “we need a god who bleeds now”
24 Analyses of religious or sexual transgression often begin questions of intentionality – see, for example, 
Palmer's exploration of American “heresy” in her analysis of US new religious movements.  Many 
ethnographies concern themselves with questions such as: why would someone choose such a radically 
alternative religious practice or gender lifestyle?  As Kaldera himself notes, “it's hard to be a freak. It's 
especially hard to be a sexual freak, as any transsexual can also tell you” (alt.com).  But beginning an 
analysis by asking why anyone engages in transgressive behaviors sets an interlocutor “the impossible 
goal of explaining behavior that has already been defined as deeply irrational or incomprehensible” 
(Halperin 2007, 11).  Questions of intentionality moreover imply a degree of voluntarism in both gender 
and religious performance that is frankly incompatible with Kaldera's accounts of both his bodily and 
religious queering.
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on and with that body (askesis) in religious contexts.  I shall not offer explanations as to 
why Kaldera wants or does anything.  Rather, I concern myself only with what Kaldera 
does, and why he says he does it.  
Kaldera attributes the work he does and has done on and with his body to his 
relationship with Hela, Norse goddess of the dead, and to his obligations as shaman to a 
queer tribe.  In this section, I examine the ways in which Kaldera's thealogy and religious 
practice—expressed through ethical, bodily self-cultivation—are informed and 
authorized by his own bodily noesis.  Again, I am arguing that Kaldera's bodily ethics 
should be considered in terms of askesis, but that Foucault's model of homosexual 
becoming does not account for the noetic quality of queer bodily-being.  Thus throughout 
this section, I identify points at which Kaldera's work on and with his body confirm 
and/or challenge Foucault's model.  I  begin by locating Kaldera's practice, Northern 
Tradition Shamanism, in a broader Pagan context.  I then explore the ways in which 
bodily noesis informs and authorizes Kaldera's religious/gender identity.  Next, I 
demonstrate the extent to which Kaldera's self-cultivation can be considered a form of 
queer askesis.  I locate Kaldera's refutation of the masculinism, secularism, and 
voluntarism of Foucault's project.  I suggest that Kaldera's bodily noesis deeply informs 
these refutations.  This chiasmus between queer askesis and bodily noesis, I offer, 
presents a liberatory understanding of both bodies and religiosity beyond those offered by 
western imaginaries.  This precedes the exploration in my final section of the ways in 
which queer bodies and non-traditional religious practice and thought expand western 
religious imaginary, allowing more sexuate creatures to flourish.  
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Raven Kaldera and Northern Tradition Shamanism
As I mentioned in my introduction,  Raven Kaldera is a female-to-male (or FTM) 
transgendered shaman.  Kaldera identifies as argr, or “unmanly” in Old Norse.  He uses 
“unmanliness” (ergi) to refer to a third, sacred sex—that is, transgender.  Kaldera locates 
his shamanic authority and power in the visible and constant performance of this 
unmanliness.  Roughly a decade ago, he founded a tradition organized around acceptance 
both of sexual transgression (bodily and practical) and acknowledgement of intimate 
relationship with and knowledge of the gods (also known—somewhat pejoratively—in 
Norse Pagan circles as “unverified personal gnosis,” or UPG.)  Kaldera's tradition, 
Northern Tradition Shamanism,  embraces and embodies unmanliness as both a gender 
and a religious identity.  
Kaldera suggests that Northern Tradition Shamanism is different than many other 
kinds of Neopaganism because 
We have so many people who are too weird for other groups. Our 
members are transgendered, or intersexual, or queer, or pierced-up, or 
tattooed, or polyamorous, or perverts, or sex workers, or poor, or 
homesteaders, or disabled, or autistic, or a little crazy, or they have odd 
religious practices, they get god-possessed or talk to spirits in a way that's 
not currently fashionable... [But] we're loyal, we're productive, we take 
care of each other, and we have damn little in the way of political wars 
compared to other small groups. (alt.com)
Northern Tradition Shamanism is one of a number of Norse Paganisms that reconstruct or 
re-imagine medieval Germanic and Nordic religious praxis.  Their primary source 
material is a body of Icelandic texts dating between 1100 and 1300 CE.  Known as “the 
lore,” this body of texts includes stories about Norse deities and heroes, collections of 
epic prose and poetry, and medieval civil codes.  
Since the early 1970s, American Norse Pagans have been using the lore to create 
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contemporary versions of Viking religiosity.  The only sociological survey of American 
Neo-Pagans25 estimated that there were between 500 and 1000 Norse Pagans in the US in 
1995.  While at the time of the survey sociologist Helen Berger did not consider Norse 
Paganisms a statistically significant portion of the US Neopagan population, membership 
in such groups has increased rapidly in the past decade.  Margot Adler, author of the only 
comprehensive ethnography of US Neopaganisms,26 noted in 2006 that Norse Pagans 
represent a vocal minority among the currently estimated 500,000 to 1 million Neopagans 
in the United States.   
With a few exceptions, Norse Pagans fit the demographic profile of most 
American converts to new religious movements.  They are almost exclusively white and 
primarily male (65%), though the number of female converts to Norse Paganism has 
increased over the last ten years.  Most Norse Pagans have graduated college and fall 
within the lower middle-class tax bracket.  Compared to the general Neo-Pagan 
population, Norse Pagans are more politically and socially conservative; but it bears 
noting that the general Neo-Pagan population is far more liberal than the US public at 
large.  (For example: In Berger’s 1995 survey, 85% of the general Neo-Pagan population 
supported gay marriage; 72% of Norse Pagans favored same-sex marriage.)  
Norse Pagans are vehement polytheists and, as I mentioned above, rely on 
primary texts for their knowledge of the Norse pantheon.  Norse Paganism is primarily a 
votive religion, which is to say that its practitioners mostly concern themselves with 
honoring their gods.  Magic use is decidedly a secondary concern, and tends to take the 
form of oracular divination, or seidr; the seid-worker, allows a god, spirit, or honored 
25 Helen Berger's Voices from the Pagan Census: A National Survey of Witches and Neo-Pagans in the 
United States (2003)
26 Drawing Down the Moon: Witches, Druids, Goddess-Worshippers, and Other Pagans in America (1979, 
2006)
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ancestor speak through her to provide protection or advice.  Spellwork in Norse context is 
traditionally women’s work; more strictly textual (or orthodox) Heathenries discourage or 
forbid men from doing spell-work for this reason.  But among moderate Norse 
Paganisms, increasing numbers of male practitioners are performing oracular divination 
despite the practice’s unmanly genealogy.  Few “mainstream” Norse Paganisms, 
however, adopt and celebrate unmanliness in the way that Kaldera and Northern Tradition 
Shamanism do.
Bodily  Noesis  : Kaldera's Gendered Religiosity and Religious Gendering  
Unmanliness, or ergi, is both a gender and a religious positionality in Northern 
Tradition Shamanism.  Kaldera in particular understands his religious identity as shaman 
and his bodily identity as transgender to be inextricably entwined.  The embodied nature 
of Kaldera's knowledge about himself and his religiosity, I suggest, indicates bodily 
noesis.  
In describing himself, Kaldera says “I now see myself as exactly what I am – a 
bigendered being who prefers a masculine body but who has no illusions about being 
anything but intersex where it matters” (Kaldera 2002, 14).  Intersex and transgender—or 
more specifically unmanliness as a sacred third sex—is for Kaldera a religious gender 
identity.  It's worth noting that Kaldera does not consider all transgendered or transsexual 
persons to be third sex.  He defines transgender as an “umbrella term to describe anyone 
who deliberately crosses back and forth over the boundaries of what we call male and 
female in this culture” (Kaldera 2002, 10).  Transsexual for Kaldera refers to “someone 
whose discomfort with the sexual characteristics of their body is so deep that they are 
willing to physically alter it through hormones and possibly surgery in order to make it 
resemble what's inside their head” (Kaldera 2002, 10-11).  Third sex, or ergi, is a subset 
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of transgender as Kaldera defines it: third sex “describes a feeling more than an 
ideological stance – specifically the feeling that your soul, the deepest part of your being, 
is poised somewhere between male and female, partaking of both but creating something 
different in the process” (Kaldera 2002, 11).  Note that Kaldera discusses unmanliness as 
a feeling, in  the deepest part of his being, that he is between genders, and that that 
position has specifically religious implications.  This, I suggest, is bodily noesis.  
In response to the question “how do your spirituality and your gender intersect?” 
Kaldera states that “they are completely intertwined. I believe that the experience of 
being Third in whatever form can be and is a spiritual path” (myhusbandbetty.com).  In 
his essay, “Ergi: The Way of the Third,” Kaldera indicates that he did not initially connect 
transgender identity with shamanism.  Rather, he says, Hela, Norse goddess of death who 
“owns [him] body and soul,” ordered him to change his gender.  Only during his post-
surgery research on historical shamanisms did Kaldera connect the two.  “When I began 
to read up on shamanism, the transgender issue hit me like a shock wave. These things 
weren't separate, they were part and parcel of the same system” (“Ergi,” 
ravenkaldera.org).  Here again, transgenderism and shamanism are for Kaldera 
inextricable, another instance of bodily noesis.
Regarding his research, Kaldera emphasizes the prevalence of gender-ambiguous 
or transgender shamans in what calls “subarctic circumpolar shamanisms,” specifically 
among the Inuit, Chukchi, and similar tribes.27  Kaldera suggests that many such shamans 
historically transgressed gender roles and engaged in unusual sexual practices (“Ergi,” 
ravenkaldera.org).  “If an ordinary person of the tribe decided to change their gender, 
27 It's worth noting that the inclusion of non-Norse mythologies into theology is an extremely contentious 
practice among Norse Paganisms.  Use of non-lore source material and the incorporation of individual 
experiences of the divine (referred to with some disdain as UPG, or “unverified personal gnosis”) sets 
Northern Tradition Shamanism at some distance from more mainstream Norse Paganisms.  
44
they might be shunned; but if a shaman did it, it was a sacred thing done by the spirits to 
give them extra power,” (“Ergi,” ravenkaldera.org).  Kaldera references archaeological 
findings, anthropological accounts, and historical documents to present a cogent narrative 
history for what he calls third sex shamanism – a religious practice centered on 
recognition of the self as physically between and/or beyond gender (“Ergi,” 
ravenkaldera.org).
Kaldera's Queer  Askesis  : A Shaman's Work on and with his Body   
Throughout his writings and interviews on his religion and his sexuality, Kaldera 
stresses the need for a third-sex shaman to work on hir body and with hir body in service 
to hir tribe.  This bodily self-cultivation, I suggest, constitutes queer askesis in 
Foucauldean terms.  Work on the body includes addressing the role of gender in the 
shaman's work and understanding sexual practices as sacred, including s/m practices. 
Addressing gender issues is vital for the third sex shaman, Kaldera insists.
We must deal fully and completely with our gender issues, as quickly and 
as honestly as possible. It is the first thing on our training, before any 
drums or rattles or chanting. If we do not deal with it, nothing will go right 
for us until we do. Period.
… Why do we have to deal with this, first? Because it's a tool. Because it's 
a power. Because seeing things from both of those sides is an important 
part of learning to shift shape, to see from other eyes, to walk between 
worlds. While non-trans people can learn it in other ways, there's no 
question that we do have something special when it comes to gaining 
perspective. (“Transgendered Spirit Workers,” ravenkaldera.org)
Addressing gender issues can but need not include surgery, Kaldera suggests.  He does 
not recommend reassignment surgery unless the shaman is willing to risk much for the 
privilege of “buying your body back” (“Would-be Transsexuals,” ravenkaldera.org). 
(Again we see knowledge created by being-in-body – here, an acknowledgement of 
internal alterity, of being simultaneously self and not-self.  I shall return to this point in a 
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moment.)  Kaldera explains that he resisted surgery “even to the point of nearly dying, 
except that the Goddess who owns my ass [Hela, Norse Goddess of Death] ordered me to 
do this, to get on with it already. When I protested, she told me that she was sending me 
where I was needed most” (sensuoussadie.com).  In this instance, knowledge of divinity 
informed Kaldera's work on his body: a religiously motivated asketical undertaking, 
required because (as Kaldera explains it) reconciling gender issues is the first work a 
third sex shaman performs on hir body.
Recognizing sexuality as sacred is equally crucial for third sex shamanism.  Work 
on the body also includes transgressive sexual practices: Kaldera’s work places heavy 
emphasis on the risk of s/m in sacred context (again recalling Foucauldean asketical 
queer praxis).  Indeed, Kaldera insists that that is how we know the practices are sacred: 
they’re not—nor can they be made—entirely safe (Kaldera 2006, 136).  His book, Dark 
Moon Rising: Pagan BDSM and the Ordeal Path, argues for the importance of spiritual 
discipline and rites of passage in Pagan praxis.  Specifically, Kaldera’s work details the 
multiple uses of pain and ordeal in ritual context.  He argues that using pain is “a 
perfectly valid way of creating a spiritual altered state… Of course,” he qualifies, “since 
we so often do this in the context of sexual play, people tend to give us the hairy eyeball 
over it,” (Kaldera 2006, 23).  S/m techniques can function within ritual context in a 
number of ways, Kaldera explains: in addition to inducing altered states, pain creates 
energy that the top28 can direct, can bring ritual participants back into their own bodies 
after trance, can serve as sacrifice to a deity, a strength ordeal, or as emotional catharsis. 
Kaldera offers lived examples of s/m’s radically transformative potentiality.   Kaldera’s 
Ordeal work is an intrinsic part (though by no means the extent) of his religious praxis.  It 
28 In s/m parlance, a top is dominant during the scene, or designated and negotiated s/m activity.  
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also, as Foucault suggested, instantiates s/m as an asketical practice.  The recognition of 
sex—particularly transgressive sex—as sacred is thus crucial to third sex shamanism. 
Understanding sex as sacred, I would suggests, indicates a bodily noesis; the practice of 
honoring that sanctity through s/m work on the body is asketical.  
Work with body in third sex shamanism manifests both through simple bodily 
presence and deliberately transgressive gender performances.  It also includes the practice 
of seidr, the practice of oracular divination I mentioned in my introduction to this section. 
While Kaldera is deeply invested in deliberately queering normative understandings of 
gender, he explains that the very presence of a transgender person does spiritual work. 
This is what he calls the “first transgender mystery”: “We are all, every one of us, 
catalysts.  We change people, and we don't even have to work at it.  All we have to do is 
stand around, and people have to struggle with their worldviews just to cope with our 
very existence” (Kaldera 2002, 23). 
Kaldera further explains that the contemporary third sex shaman's body must 
transgress gender and sexual norms in religious context.  More importantly, the shaman 
must be public about both gender-queering behaviors and transgressive sexual activities. 
In this model, gender queering can span from cross-dressing in ritual context to a full 
surgical gender change, according to what the gods ask of the shaman.  Kaldera further 
clarifies that transgressive sex need not necessarily be homosexual object choice.  “When 
you move into the middle of the gender continuum, there comes a point where labels like 
'gay, lesbian, straight' are irrelevant; all sexual interactions become somehow queer” 
(Kaldera 2002, 22).  Kaldera places primary emphasis on the need for public performance 
of these transgressive behaviors.  
47
It isn't enough to be third-gendered internally. You have to be visibly 
different in that way as well, whether it's only that your ceremonial 
costume has strong elements of clothing that is socially acceptable only 
for a sex different from the one that you most appear, or that you must act 
in a way that is deliberately gender-inappropriate. Your gender 
transgressing has to be evident to everyone who comes to see you in your 
professional capacity, and you may never deny it when asked. (“Ergi,” 
ravenkaldera.org)
Publicly breaking gender and sexual norms sets the third-sex spirit worker apart and 
allows hir gods and honored dead to speak through hir, specifically through oracular 
divination.  Kaldera calls this third-sex spirit work argr, unmanly, because “we need a 
word for this thing that we are and do (for it's both something we are and something we 
do [that is, the word is performative]), and we see the echo of this same 
power/blessing/curse/wiring/energy/ sacredness in those brief glimpses of the ones called 
ergi [in Norse Pagan lore],” (“Ergi,” ravenkaldera.org).  
Finally, the third sex shaman works with hir body in religious context through the 
practice of seidr: speaking on behalf of the dead to guide hir spiritual community. 
Kaldera's tribe, as he calls them, extends beyond Northern Tradition Shamanism to 
include 
transsexuals, both transwomen and transmen. Genderqueers. Cross-
dressers of whatever stripe, fetishistic or otherwise. The normal-looking 
ones who have an inner female or male so strong that they demand part of 
their life, especially part of their sexual life. The intersexuals like myself 
who look in the mirror and know what they are, and want the freedom to 
be that.  The ones who just know, inside, that they are both male and 
female -not theoretically but intimately, to know with every fiber of your 
body that you have walked in the world and male and female and 
something in between. You are all my tribe. (“Transgendered Spirit 
Workers,” ravenkaldera.org)
Kaldera and his tribe have dedicated themselves to honoring their gods, to ministering to 
other “unmanly” people who also feel called to honor these gods, and to speak for their 
honored dead—those killed for doing and speaking gender wrong.  
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Our Dead are angry, and they demand this of us: that as much as we are 
able, we will do what has to be done to make sure that there are no more 
fallen in this war. In order to save each other, we must band together and 
take care of each other, because alone we go down. (“Transgendered Spirit 
Workers,” ravenkaldera.org)
Thus transgender presence, performance, and practice (seidr) all constitute shamanic 
work with the body – and, I would argue, queer askesis in religious context.
Kaldera's queer becoming further constitutes queer askesis in his bodily 
cultivation of the self by the self, the establishment of a non-normative morality, and the 
experience of internal alterity.  As I have suggested, however, Foucauldean homosexual 
becoming does not fully account for Kaldera's work on and with his body: primarily 
because becoming homosexual does not incorporate queer bodies and religiosity.  More, 
Kaldera's becoming queer is not wholly based on choice.  Thus while Foucault's model 
provides insight into Kaldera's work on and with his body, I suggest Kaldera's 
experiences require a further analytical model: that of bodily noesis.    
Work on the body through addressing gender discomfort constitutes a self-
cultivation in this context, but one informed and reinforced by bodily knowledge.  For 
Kaldera himself, dealing with his gender included hormone treatments and a double 
mastectomy, which he refers to as “buying [his] body back” (“Would-be Transsexuals,” 
ravenkaldera.org).  Kaldera notes that this cultivation of self, in addition to reflecting his 
religious role as shaman, nourished his body and his mind.
I learned from [an FTM support group] that I didn't have to be squarely on 
the opposite end of the gender paradigm in order to change my body, that I 
didn't have to live with the discomfort. Change was possible and 
reasonable and didn't need to be justified...
It was one thing to think that my body would make things better, but 
nothing prepared me for how good it would actually be. Twelve hours 
after my first shot of testosterone, the chemical depression I'd had since 
puberty lifted, literally, on the spot. It was as if a gray cloud had been 
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lifted from the world, and I laughed hysterically the entire first night. 
“Who needs Prozac!” I crowed. “I've got boy juice!” 
(library.humboldt.edu)
Kaldera emphasizes that having his body reflect his inner understanding of self  benefits 
him physically and mentally, while making it possible to better serve his tribe and his 
gods.  This bodily cultivation for the betterment of self and community recalls the project 
of queer becoming, but also suggests a knowledge created by being-in-body.  
Though Kaldera maintains that third sex shamanism is incontrovertible for him, 
he acknowledges that his religious practice is not for everyone.  “I call myself a pagan 
fundamentalist [but] it's not because I'm intolerant – my religion states that this path is 
not for everyone, so I am fundamentally, rabidly tolerant on principle” (twpt.com). Third 
sex shamanism, then, represents a non-normative morality characteristic of queer askesis, 
but is nevertheless rooted in noetic transgender identity.  
Finally, the experience of internal alterity recalls Foucault's project of queer 
becoming while reflecting a specific kind of bodily knowledge.  Indeed, the feeling of 
being other-than one's body inherent to transgenderism brings this experience of alterity 
into sharp relief.  Kaldera relates: 
I felt like an impostor, no matter what I did. I was afraid that no matter 
how hard I tried, they'd still somehow be able to look at me and strip away 
my mask. Sometimes they did. I was often accused of "male behavior," 
even when I couldn't figure out what was wrong with my behavior. My 
health deteriorated in reaction to the medications I took to keep my body 
from becoming masculine. One night as I endured the massive 
hemorrhaging that threatened to put me in the hospital—a side effect of 
my artificial hormonal soup—I finally decided that maintaining my 
assigned gender was not worth ruining my health. I began to contemplate 
changing to male hormones.  Once I'd faced the idea, there was no turning 
back.
There's a card in the tarot deck called "temperance." The often 
androgynous angel on it, shown standing with one foot on the water and 
one on land, is pouring fire and water back and forth between two cups. I 
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feel like that much of the time, one foot in each world, frantically juggling 
opposite elements. Not just male and female either; there are also the 
separate countries of hormones and culture, intersex and transgender, 
spirituality and intellectualism, queer and transsexual, and so forth. The 
lines aren't stable; they move around, but they're easy to find. Just come 
and look for me. Where I stand, there's the line. Where I move, the line 
goes with me. I live on it. It is imprinted into my flesh.  You can take my 
clothes off and see for yourself.  (library.humboldt.edu)
The experience of feeling not-self is not a philosophical one for Kaldera.  The experience 
of internal alterity, of being other-than-self, is a key component in his queer religiosity 
and his queer becoming – one informed by bodily knowledge of feeling not-self. 
Kaldera's religiosity is demonstrably a cultivation of the self; however, in sharp 
contrast to homosexual becoming, his self-cultivation is to some extent involuntary.  This 
lack of choice can be attributed first to Kaldera's transgenderism – his queerness is 
bodily, not based solely on sexual practice (contra Halperin).29  However, Kaldera's 
relationship to divinity—Hela owns him; he is a godslave—further complicates the 
limitation of queer becoming to sexual choice.    In each case, we may observe bodily 
noesis functioning: both in the bodily knowledge of self, and in the embodied knowledge 
of divinity.  In this way, noesis complicates the radical voluntarism of queer askesis.
Kaldera repeatedly refutes the notion of choice in transgenderism throughout his 
writings and interviews.
Those of us who “do” gender...twist it and play with it and transform it 
into something quite different from what society intends... We don't get the 
privilege of living an unquestioned life. (Kaldera 2002, 58; emphasis 
added)
There's a place in that hell called 'transition' where you are passing from 
one side to the other, and you are suddenly so much both that you are 
29 It's worth noting, however, that transgender as a bodily or sexual identity has only existed since 1974 
(cf. The Oxford English Dictionary, as well as Halberstam, on this point.)  Compare “transsexual” 
(1957).  While I do not contest or intend to undermine Kaldera's statement, it bears consideration that 
the lack of voluntarism he gestures at is considerably less constrained than it might have been even fifty 
years ago.
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neither. For some, it's a split second; for others, several years, but we 
never forget it. We may repress it, but we never forget it. Some of us are 
living in that sacred space right now... We did not choose to be what we 
are, and we cannot unchoose it. But being what we are has given us 
choices, choices the likes of which you can only hope to imagine. 
(“Feminist on Testosterone,” ravenkaldera.org; emphasis added)  
The marginality of trans-existence is, as Kaldera demonstrates, not based solely on 
choice.  It is a fact of trans life – a matter of knowing one's body.  This lack of choice is 
further complicated by the surrender of agency to a deity.  As I have mentioned, the 
Norse goddess of Death owns Raven.  Thus, he says, “I’m spiritually required to ‘speak 
my truth’...I’m not allowed to euphemize it by the Powers that Own My Ass” 
(sensuoussadie.com).  He and third sex shamans like him are “the ones who have no 
choice, for whom spirit-work has eaten our entire lives, the ones for whom saying no is 
impossible because we are already bound by this calling” (“Transgendered Spirit 
Workers,” ravenkaldera.org).  Kaldera's relationship to divinity is further connected to his 
bodily knowledge.  Religious obligation and bodily necessity complicate the rhetoric of 
radical voluntarism operative in both gay and queer askesis.  
Thus, as I have shown, Kaldera's queer religiosity both instantiates and challenges 
Foucault's homosexual becoming.  While askesis provides a useful analytical model 
within which to think about Kaldera's work on and with his body, Foucault's model is 
ultimately insufficient to describe Kaldera's religious experience.  I have argued that 
bodily noesis—knowledge created about the self and about divinity by the experience of 
being-in-body—offers further insight into Kaldera's self-cultivation.  In my next section, 
I explore the ways in which queer askesis and bodily noesis work together to expand 
what Jantzen calls the western religious imaginary, thus creating space for queer bodies 
and non-traditional modes of religiosity to flourish.  
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CHAPTER THREE
Queer Bodies Becoming Divine: Expanding Western Imaginaries
I suggested in my previous section that Raven Kaldera's story is one of noetic 
self-fashioning: he has worked on and with his body in ways that reflect his embodied 
and bodily experiences of the divine.  Thus I have argued that Kaldera instantiates the 
ways in which religion occurs at the chiasmus between queer askesis and bodily noesis.  
By using the term chiasmus, I imply an intersection, but also a creative disruption 
within the western bodily and religious imaginaries.  In Becoming Divine: Towards a 
Feminist Philosophy of Religion, Grace Jantzen employed this Derridean term to indicate 
the convergence of close reading and alterity – what Derrida referred to as “double 
reading” (1998, 59).  Chiasmus, then, suggests a dominant reading “intersected by its 
own undoing” (Jantzen 1998, 74).  The term implies an opening in dominant discourse, 
the irruption of radically different modes of thought.  Specifically in the context of the 
western religious imaginary, 
what the chiasmus opens out is the possibility of thinking differently, 
recognizing that this God of classical theism around whom the binary is 
constructed is not the only concept of God available, and that a feminist 
philosophy of religion would do well not just to debate or critique 
[Lacan's] 'good old God' ...but to explore other conceptions of the divine. 
(Jantzen 1998, 75-6)
These other understandings of divinity, I have suggested, are informed both by 
knowledge created by being-in-body and the deliberate work with and on the body 
toward ethical subjectivity.  In this way, religion allows queer askesis and bodily noesis to 
create meaning about bodies in relationship to themselves and to the divine.  In the case 
of Kaldera, these bodily/religious relationships, perhaps unsurprisingly, are transgressive 
– one might say, queer.  However, as Foucault and Kaldera have both demonstrated, such 
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modes of relationality create space for those outside the traditional scope of bodies and 
religion to flourish.  
This space for flourishing, I suggest, is largely imaginary.  As I mentioned in my 
introduction, imaginary here does not imply false.  Rather, the term encompasses the 
symbolic and linguistic systems that inform and constrain our understandings of what it is 
possible to do, be, think, and believe. I have referred to both bodily and religious 
imaginaries.  The western religious imaginary, which Jantzen theorizes at length and to 
which I shall return in a moment, understands divinity as transcendent, logical, infinite, 
salvation-oriented, and disembodied (while paradoxically also portraying god as one 
heterosexual white man).  I also posit a western bodily imaginary, complicit in the 
understanding that bodies can be neatly divided into two biologically evident sexes, and 
that the sex evident at a child's birth is a permanent feature of that child's identity.  
Raven Kaldera, as I have shown, challenges both the western bodily and religious 
imaginaries.  Kaldera advocates and embodies radical deconstructions and re-imaginings
—a queering—of gender and religion.  In this section, I examine the ways in which 
Kaldera's queer askesis and bodily noesis work to expand bodily and religious 
imaginaries.  I begin by laying out the western religious imaginary as Grace Jantzen 
conceptualized it in Becoming Divine.  I then examine the function of sexuate bodies 
within Jantzen's religious imaginary, and explore the ways in which Kaldera's queer 
askesis and bodily noesis ratify and expand Jantzen's thought.  Finally, I detail the 
incompatibilities between Jantzen's feminist philosophy of religion and Kaldera's 
religious practice, particularly with regard to divine presence.  I conclude by suggesting 
that while Jantzen's divine becoming does not fully describe Kaldera's bodily or religious 
experience, divinity as horizon does work in ways comparable to Kaldera's noetic self-
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fashioning.  
The Western Religious Imaginary
By suggesting that queer askesis and bodily noesis work toward expanding the 
western religious imaginary, I mean the following: transgressive practices, transgressive 
bodies, transgressive identities, push the boundaries of what it is possible to think about 
religious practice, about human bodies, about subjectivity.  The religious imaginary, like 
gender and other cultural constructs, is not wholly our own; what we imagine is 
constrained to varying degrees by history, culture, education, and personal experience, 
among countless other factors.  But I would suggest that it is precisely the expansion, the 
tension between what is and what is possible, that make these efforts toward queer 
becoming so significant.
Struggles to expand the religious imaginary—to queer the ways we think about 
religion and about divinity—are concrete, ethical efforts toward thinking differently, 
toward seeing if we can be other than what we are.  In striving to become religiously 
queer, we are asking ourselves: what else can be divine?  What else can be religious? 
Throughout this paper, I have suggested that queerness can be a site for the religious 
cultivation of the self, as religion can be a site for the queer cultivation of the self.  In 
struggling to become queer, we ourselves can approach the divine.  The struggle to 
become divine makes this so.
Grace Jantzen defined divinity as the conditions under which one can flourish. 
Flourishing for Jantzen implied an ethical process of achieving subjectivity; to that end, 
she worked toward creatively disrupting the western religious imaginary.  Becoming 
Divine addressed the masculinist construction of the western religious symbolic. 
Anglophone philosophies of religion, Jantzen argued, have imagined divinity as a “God 
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who is also a Word...who in his eternal disembodiment, omnipotence, and omniscience is 
the epitome of value,” (Jantzen 1999, 10). The God of the Western imaginary, she argued, 
lacks materiality but is presumably both male and heterosexual for all that “he” is 
incorporeal. Though she is not explicit on the point, Jantzen's presumed godhead is also 
singular, indicated by her continued use of the first person masculine singular in 
describing “Him.” Thus according to Jantzen, the traditional god of the west is one 
straight male without a body, an “assumed divine presence” signifying everything, hidden 
behind and within both language and broader symbolic patterns of cultures themselves 
(1999, 188).
Following Irigaray, Jantzen argued that subjectivity requires the disruption of the 
western religious imaginary itself, since "religious discourse serves as the linchpin of the 
western symbolic," (1999, 12). Jantzen, with Irigaray, called us to displace "masculinist 
structures by a new imaginary not based on the Name of the Father but on new ways of 
conceiving and being" that honor the subjectivity of all people (1999, 12).  Jantzen did 
not intend this displacement to be a singular departure from the Western religious 
imaginary; rather, she described re-imagining divinity as a process of becoming divine. 
Divinity for Jantzen is creativity, endless possibility, “a process…ever new” through 
which we, as embodied, sexuate creatures, nurture and protect each other (1999, 254).  
Jantzen posited a model for divinity-in-process: god as divine horizon.  She 
suggested that we must strive toward an understanding of God as radically immanent, 
multiple, carnal, material, and not necessarily or exclusively male or heteronormative. 
For Jantzen, God had ceased to be a placeholder for disembodied transcendence, truth or 
salvation.  Rather, she argued, it is our moral obligation to achieve subjectivity—to speak 
and live in ways that honor the interconnectedness and transience of all living things.  In 
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short, Jantzen challenged us to become divine.  
To become divine—that is, to achieve embodied, sexuate subjectivity—Jantzen 
maintained that we must recognize and disrupt the existent western religious symbolic. 
Becoming Divine primarily focuses upon the symbolic organization(s) and coding(s) of 
religious discourses, which Jantzen identified as intrinsically masculinist.  The western 
symbolic is constructed through linguistic systems wherein the phallus is the dominant 
(Lacan would say universal) signifier.    The western religious symbolic understands this 
phallus theologically: Lacan explicitly linked the phallus to God as Father (Jantzen 1999, 
10).  Anglo-American philosophers of religion, Jantzen argued, have established a 
reflexive system whereby they attributed their values (detached and timeless 
intellectualism, what she called “the scientific method of modernity”) to Lacan’s “good 
old God,” and then defended the primacy of disembodied reason as god-given (1999, 23).
Jantzen argued that western religiosity is dictated by logic, invested in truth 
claims, organized according to binaries, and opposed to both death and difference: or 
what she identified as “the detached and objective intellectual stance which traditional 
philosophers of religion assume and which they take also to be characteristic of God" 
(1999, 263).  The truth claims implicit in western rationalism lead to an emphasis on 
“creedal and epistemic justification” (Jantzen 1999; 197, 99).  Creedal primacy—what 
Kristeva referred to as the “thetic” pillar of masculinist logic—yields a theological over-
emphasis on salvation and the afterlife1.  "It is precisely whether one has true beliefs or 
not that is decisive for salvation, where salvation is understood ultimately in terms of life 
after death" (Jantzen 1999, 21).  The god of the western religious imaginary, following 
this line of thought, could be considered logically, would known best in terms of belief, 
and must come from beyond the material world to save us from death.  Thus logic, belief, 
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the intellect, and God-the-Word himself are the guarantors of meaning in western 
discourse: the phallus, in Lacanian terms.
If, as Derrida and Jantzen suggested, God functions as the phallus—that is, as the 
guarantor of linguistic meaning, allowing entrance into the symbolic, and thus into 
civilization—then (following Lacan)  God the Word denies the Other access to both 
subjectivity and divinity.  This denial is ultimately and broadly harmful, Jantzen argued, 
because
a religious symbolic which functions to perpetuate a dream of masculine 
self-presence, where the male subject refuses to recognize his situatedness, 
his embodied sexuate self, and his unconscious fears and desires of death, 
is destructive…in that it will nourish in such men the idea that it is their 
God-given right to dominate all (m)others...in that it allows no emergence 
of women subjects in relation to a female divine.  And it is destructive of 
the men themselves, whose self-constitution as little godlings actually 
perpetuates their own fears and insecurities. (Jantzen 1999, 173)
By simultaneously sanctifying gender hierarchy and obscuring its linguistic and cultural 
functions, western philosophy of religion demonstrates “a masculinism hostile to the 
possibility of women subjects,” and, by extension, hostile to the subjectivity of queers, 
people of color, non-westerners, the impoverished, and all other Others (Jantzen 1999, 
175).  The alleged gender-blindness of religious linguistic systems is thus indicative of 
broader and more insidious inscriptions of difference throughout western religious 
thought.
Jantzen suggested that although language—particularly language about God—is 
usually masculinist, we also can use language against itself to say new things, to think 
differently.  In order to change the way we think about God, Jantzen argued, we must first 
change the language and symbols we use for God.  That is, we must shift the religious 
imaginary.
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To achieve subjectivity, women and all those “othered” by the western cultural 
symbolic must re-imagine the divine.  Citing Irigaray, Jantzen insisted that 
for women to develop a subjectivity of our own, and not merely take up 
masculinized subject positions, it would be necessary to disrupt the 
symbolic, displacing its masculinist structures by a new imaginary not 
based on the Name of the Father but on new ways of conceiving and being 
which enable women to be subjects as women.  And since religious 
discourse severs as the linchpin of the western symbolic, it is religion 
above all which requires to be disrupted. (Jantzen 1999, 12)
However, gender-inclusive religious language does not necessarily disrupt the western 
symbolic or automatically grant one subjectivity.  “Rather human personhood is 
achieved, and achieved at considerable cost” (Jantzen 1999, 9).  The gendered, desiring 
subjectivity Jantzen envisioned was continually being achieved in “fragile and fluctuating 
fragments,” and constructed in recognition of a multiplicity of difference and attentive to 
concerns of justice (Jantzen 1999; 37, 26).  This subject could no more be the unified 
female subject of "women's experience" than the unified male subject posited by western 
philosophy of religion (Jantzen 1999, 58).  
In order to productively disrupt the western religious symbolic and achieve 
gendered, desiring subjectivity, Jantzen (with Irigaray) necessitated a divine horizon, “an 
ideal of wholeness to which we aspire” (Jantzen 1999, 12).  That is, Jantzen re-imagined 
God as a horizon, a process of becoming.  She borrowed Mary Daly’s concept of God-
the-Verb, of “Godding,” to think of the divine not in terms of who It is, but of what It 
does (Jantzen 1999, 258).  Jantzen would have us understand God as growth and change, 
in radically feminist terms.  To do this, she suggested, we should think of God as not 
something (or Someone) to be believed in dogmatically, but to be imagined in terms of 
possibility: “‘the possibilities of awareness and transcendence' of the personal and 
interpersonal positions we take up as subjects in space and time" (Jantzen 1999, 12).  God 
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should not be an entity that comes from outside to save us from ourselves, but the process 
by which we, as embodied, sexuate creatures, nurture and protect each other and our 
environment.  Imagined thus, becoming divine allows us to flourish.  
Contingency, mutability, embodiment, and justice are all implicit in the 
achievement of divine subjectivity, of “becoming our sacred sexuate selves in relation to 
the earth and to one another” (Jantzen 1999, 24).  Imagining God as in process, as within 
time, as embodied, radically immanent, and within all living things—imaging divinity as 
us—allows us to flourish.  Rethinking religion in this way, Jantzen argued, makes creedal 
claims less important and “prioritize[s] the ethical rather than the ontological” (Jantzen 
1999, 252; cf. Levinas).  Thus for Jantzen our fundamental religious obligation was not 
right belief, but the achievement of gendered, embodied, desiring subjectivity.  She 
challenged us to bring God to life “through us and between us, embodied, transcendent, 
the projection and reclamation of ultimate value, the enablement of subject-positions as 
women” (Jantzen 1999, 275).  In short, Jantzen championed divinity as the process of 
achieving sacred subjectivity and exhorted each of us to flourish, to become divine.
[First sentence is funky] I am by no means arguing that religion is a gender-
performance exempt; however, there is a degree of latitude granted to insubordinate 
gender performances in (some?) religious context(s?).    Religious gender transgression, 
whether votive or practical, is not unconstrained by an existing religious imaginary. 
However, what space there is allows for transgressive performances; the imaginary 
expands each time someone does religion different.  Kaldera, as I have shown, does both 
religion  and sex/gender very differently: significantly, in a non-normative manner (cf. 
Foucault and Halperin), and without concern for salvation or set religious doctrine (cf. 
Jantzen).  
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Kaldera's emphasis on deism, polytheism, animism, and spiritual discipline all 
challenge traditional religiosity as Jantzen presented it; but his greatest challenge to the 
western religious imaginary lies in his insistence, like Jantzen's, that gender can and 
should play a central role in one's religiosity.  However, Kaldera's thealogy and religious 
practice challenge the western bodily imaginary in ways Jantzen's feminist philosophy of 
religion did not.   
The Western Bodily Imaginary
For all her emphasis on the gendered work done by the western religious imaginary, 
Jantzen did not address the ways in which that imaginary shapes and constrains our 
understandings of bodies: specifically, the notion that bodies always come in two discreet 
sexes; and that anatomical sex is always unambiguous and fixed.  Kaldera, obviously, 
challenges both these assumptions.  Jantzen challenged neither.  
While there is brief mention of heteronormative complicity within the western 
religious imaginary, Jantzen failed to account for what I have called queer bodies.  I 
suggest her theory might have been strengthened if she examined in greater detail the 
ways in which bodily and religious imaginaries mutually reinforce each other.  As I have 
shown, Jantzen presented God the Word as God the Phallus (cf. Daly), and problematized 
Lacan's insistence on the phallus as the universal signifier.  Thus, as Jantzen 
demonstrated, the phallus stands in for a metaphysics of presence.  However, I would 
suggest that the phallus similarly bestows meaning and significance to human anatomy, 
thus constraining understandings of what bodies should look like, do and mean.  The 
western bodily imaginary further includes heteronormativity; that is, how sexuate bodies 
should interact with each other.  
I would suggest that Jantzen's reification of what I call the western bodily 
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imaginary contributes, at least in part, to her philosophical gender essentialization and the 
occlusion of queer bodies30 from her project.  Nevertheless, divinity-as-horizon 
demonstrates the ways in which religiosity may mark a chiasmus betweeen queer askesis  
and bodily noesis. Embodied sexuateness as flourishing creates space for a subjectivity 
that does not bracket those transgressive sexual practices that inspire recognition of self 
as queer.  Thus sacred queer becoming is a horizon, a struggle to flourish in the world, 
both a moral obligation and a system of bodily practices.   In such a relationship, religion 
may create space for transgressive gender performance, while expressions of 
transgressive gender may authorize unconventional modes of religiosity.  
Kaldera discusses this in his “Ergi” essay: shamans, he claims, were allowed to do 
things, religiously and bodily, that ordinary people weren't.  Regarding his research on 
subarctic circumpolar shamanisms, Kaldera explains: “if an ordinary person of the tribe 
decided to change their gender, they might be shunned, but if a shaman did it, it was a 
sacred thing done by the spirits to give them extra power” (“Ergi,” ravenkaldera.org). 
Note here that, much as with Foucauldean askesis, the authorization for queer practice is 
not legal or rights-based.  Rather, religion (also) makes space for this kind of queer 
becoming – one informed by knowledge created by being in a queer (in Kaldera's case, 
intersexed and transgendered) body.  
The Challenge of Divine Presence
The location of religious practice and identity in personal experience can be a 
liberatory gesture, particularly when more traditional modes of religiosity deny both one's 
30 I should reiterate that not all transfolk are politically, theoretically, or religiously invested in queering 
anything.  As Jay Prosser notes in his 1998 Second Skins: The Body Narratives of Transsexuality: “not 
every gender-crossing is queerly subversive… There are transsexuals who seek very pointedly to be 
nonperformative, to be constantive, quite simply, to be” (264; contra Halberstam).  But, to bastardize 
Derrida: there is not one, but many queernesses.  In Kaldera's case, I suggest, transgender identity can 
(also) be understood in terms of queer becoming.
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experience and one's existence.  This, certainly, has been the case for Kaldera – which is 
why he calls himself a “mythical beast.”  While the western bodily imaginary occludes 
intersexed and transgendered bodies, and the western religious imaginary marginalizes 
polytheistic, embodied, contingent divinity, Kaldera and Northern Tradition Shamanism 
acknowledge and celebrate queer bodies and queer religiosity.  
There is danger, as well as space to flourish, in basing religious ideology on 
personal experience.  As Wayne Proudfoot suggests, religious experience is always 
shaped and constrained by language, though the noetic quality of that experience makes it 
seem immediate.  And as Jantzen has shown, our language and symbols are rife with 
gendered and religious assumptions – which is why she, with Derrida, argued against 
religious truth claims and a metaphysics of presence.  It perhaps safer to assume, with 
Foucault, that the soul and God have no metaphysical referent.  If we made god, we can 
fix Hir, too.  But while Kaldera, like Jantzen, de-emphasizes the primacy of creedal 
claims, he also adamantly maintains an ontological concept of divinity.  Thus I must 
suggest with Laurel Schneider that understandings of divinity, like understandings of 
bodies, must be multiple and must account for divine presence.  Indeed, “multiplicity 
exceeds abstract principles (even attractive ones like 'becoming') whenever those 
principles eclipse presence” (2008, 4).  
For all that Kaldera differs with Jantzen on the matter of divine, I would suggest 
that the elasticity of the western religious imaginary as she has theorized it allows for the 
kind of queering Kaldera embodies.  This is not meant to make the religious imaginary 
sound utopic.  Religious practice and religious belief are strongly policed by what Jantzen 
calls the western religious imaginary; though it's beyond the scope of this paper, I would 
argue that what Pellegrini calls the Christo-normative religious attitude of the US abjects 
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those unwilling to imagine divinity as a one male presumably straight often while 
disembodied deity.  It's also worth noting that the kind of queer becoming proposed in 
this paper—one in which the subject cultivates hirself toward an ethical, sexual, and 
religious horizon—could work equally well as a model for de-queering: see, for example, 
Erzen's work on ex-gay ministries in Straight to Jesus.  Further, as I have argued 
elsewhere,31 we cannot fully account for how others will read our attempts at disruptive 
gender performance.  Failure to perform gender in legible ways can result in grievous 
bodily, as the alarmingly high rate of homicide in the trans community suggests. 
Nevertheless, Kaldera's account of his own beliefs and practices demonstrates that it is 
possible (not easy or simple, but possible) to queer the western religious imaginary.  His 
beliefs and practices have quite literally created space for others to pursue comparably 
transgressive gender identities and religious practices: he, his wife Bella, and his boy32 
Joshua own and maintain a pagan homestead in central Massachusetts.  
Kaldera's is a queerness based not solely on sexual choice, but also on an 
embodied noesis: the knowledge about oneself created by the experience of being in one's 
body.  Becoming queer, particularly in the case of transgender or intersex persons, 
necessitates the confrontation of internal alterity – of feeling other than what one looks 
like, or has been told to be.  Neither the asketical efforts to become queer nor the noetic 
quality of bodily-being happen in a vacuum: our self-cultivations and our knowledge of 
31 Megan Goodwin, “Dangerous 'Interscetions:' 'Unmanliness' in Abject Religious Discourse” (paper 
presented at the national meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, IL, 31 Oct – 2 Nov 
2008).
32 The term “boy” here fits within a s/m taxonomy.   Again, I use this term because both Raven and Joshua 
use it.  They have a Master/slave relationship.  Raven owns Joshua, by which I mean he controls every 
aspect of Joshua's life, with Joshua's consent.    This plays out not only, or even primarily, in blatantly 
carnal context, but also in ritual context—Raven will offer Joshua's blood as sacrifice—as well as under 
quotidian circumstances (while I was at Cauldron Farm, Joshua asked Raven's permission before 
drinking each of two and a half beers at Loki's birthday party). 
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ourselves are constrained by many factors, sexuate discourse not the least among them. 
But there is space for insubordination, for productive disruption – for queering.  And 
queering, ultimately, is the role of the third sex shaman.  As Kaldera says, “unmanly” 
shamans “turn the world upside down. We are living, walking catalysts, and this is the 
first mystery of our existence. We turn everything that people think they know about 
gender - that supposedly safe ground beneath their feet - upside down. We change 
worlds” (“Ergi,” ravenkaldera.org).
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CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper, I have argued the chiasmus of work on and with the body (queer 
askesis) and knowledge created by being-in-body (bodily noesis) makes possible 
radically different thought about bodies and religiosity (expansion of western 
imaginaries).  Thinking differently about bodies and religion, I have suggested, creates 
space for those occluded or excluded by traditional conceptions of corporality and/or 
divinity.  The emphasis on an understanding of the body and the divine in which queer 
people of faith may recognize themselves should not be considered a mere pluralistic 
inclusion, but rather an attempt at a liberatory epistemic shift.  Honoring the sexuate self 
as sacred both acknowledges knowledge created by the experience of being in a mutable, 
multiple, finite, and contingent body, and informs and directs religious work on and with 
that body.  
In pursuing this argument, I first examined the concept of queer askesis.  I located 
this idea in conversation with Foucault's project of becoming homosexual, as he 
described it in a series of late-life interviews.  I examined the ways in which The Use of  
Pleasure and The Care of the Self provided an historical precedent for ethical bodily self-
cultivation through non-normalizing sexual moralities.  I then demonstrated the 
occlusions of Foucault's project, specifically those of gender, queer bodies, and religion. 
I suggested that homosexual becoming offered analytical insight into the shamanic work 
Raven Kaldera has done on and with his body; however, the radical voluntarism, 
masculinism, and secularism of Foucault's model occluded Kaldera from becoming 
homosexual.
My second section offered a second concept through which to consider Kaldera's 
self-cultivation: that of bodily noesis.  I looked at the ways in which the knowledge 
Kaldera located in his queer bodily being informed the religious work he did on and with 
his body.  I noted points at which Kaldera's experience both confirmed and challenged 
Foucault's model.  The chiasmus I have located in Kaldera's religious and bodily 
experience, I suggested, presents a a liberatory understanding of both bodies and 
religiosity beyond those offered by western imaginaries.  
In my final section, I suggested that Kaldera's bodily noesis and queer askesis 
challenge western religious and bodily imaginaries.  Kaldera advocates and instantiates 
queer bodily-being and queer religious practice, thus expanding what is thinkable for 
both.  This expansion of western imaginaries is important, I posited, because this 
liberatory project creates space beyond traditional religious and bodily imaginaries, 
which mutually enforce each other.  Thus I have demonstrated the potential for religion to 
mark a chiasmus between bodily noesis and queer askesis, providing a liberatory model 
of divinity for those excluded by the western religious imaginary.
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